390 /l/-48
Ch. xxiii Is Anything Good, Bad, or Indifferent by Nature?
- Fire, which by nature is hot, appears to everyone as capable of
producing heat, and snow, which is by nature cold, appears to everyone
as capable of producing cold, and everything which moves something in
virtue of its nature moves all people who are in a natural condition in
the same way, as they say. But, as we shall suggest, none of the things
said to be good move all men as a good. Therefore, there is nothing good
by nature. Now they say it is evident that none of the things said to be
good moves all men in the same way. 180. For leaving aside ordinary
people, some of whom believe that a sound bodily condition is good,
others fornication, others gluttony, others drunkenness, others gambling,
others greed, and others even worse things, some philosophers them-
selves, like the Peripatetics, say that there are three kinds of goods, those
of the soul, such as the virtues, bodily [goods], such as health and the
like, and external [goods], such as friends, wealth and related things. - The Stoics themselves also say that there is a triad of goods: those
in the soul, such as the virtues; external, such as the virtuous man and
the friend; and some that are neither in the soul nor external, such as
the virtuous man in relation to himself. But the bodily things said to be
good by the Peripatetics, they say are not good. Some [philosophers]
have accepted pleasure as good, some say that this is exactly what the
bad is, so that one philosopher [Antisthenes] even cried out "I would
rather be mad than experience pleasure". - If, then, the things that move something in virtue of their nature
move all men similarly, and we are not all similarly moved by the things
said to be good, there is nothing good by nature. For because of the
conflict among the abovementioned positions, it is not possible to have
confidence in all or any of them. For he who says that one ought to have
confidence in this position and not at all in that one, becomes a partisan
in the disagreement, since he is holding a position to which there are
opposing positions among the dogmatists and, for this reason, he himself
will be in no position to judge the truth of the other positions, but will
himself, along with the others, be in need of one who can judge the
truth. So, since there is no agreed upon criterion or demonstration,
because of the undecided disagreement regarding these matters, he will
arrive at the suspension of judgement, and for this reason, will not be
able to assert definitely what is good by nature. - Further, some say that good is either choosing itself or that which
we choose. Choosing, then, is not good according to the proper sense of
the term, for we would not be hastening to get that which we choose,