132 Strawsonian Compatibilism
because it is appropriate to hold them responsible for such conduct. Regardless,
the idea is that the metaphysical “in virtue of ” facts that serve as the basis for a per-
son’s being morally responsible for her conduct are found not in some set of inde-
pendent facts about persons and their agency but rather in facts about our practices
and norms of holding co- members of a moral community to account. Such a defla-
tionary view of the underlying metaphysics of the conditions of responsibility is
amenable to a compatibilist thesis. Why? A collection of natural facts about our
social practices and norms of holding to account serve to set all of the conditions—
including the freedom conditions—for morally responsible agency.
6.4. Strawson’s Arguments for Compatibilism
In this section we canvass Strawson’s arguments for compatibilism. In the sub-
sequent section we consider a range of critical reactions to these arguments. One
can identify three distinct arguments for compatibilism in Strawson’s essay. Two
others are also suggested, perhaps not as distinct arguments, but as supporting
reasons. For ease of discussion, we will treat them as free- standing arguments.
6.4.1. The Argument from Exculpation
Strawson’s first argument, which is the most complex, might be called his Argu-
ment from Exculpation. Incompatibilists contend that if determinism were true
no one would be morally responsible for anything. Thus determinism would
provide universal grounds for exculpating everyone from moral responsibility.
At this point Strawson asks: Given the nature of moral responsibility, would the
truth of determinism provide a reason for universal suspension of blaming? To
answer this question, he examines how our exculpating pleas function within the
context of our actual moral responsibility practices. How do excuses, justifica-
tions, and exemptions actually work when they defeat the bases for blaming?
According to Strawson, pleas designed to show that someone is not blame-
worthy for something she has done divide into two general categories. Some
show that a person who is a morally responsible agent is not after all blamewor-
thy for some particular seemingly objectionable act. She was pushed or shoved,
or was non- culpably ignorant of what she was doing. Or given the circum-
stances, what she did was after all not objectionable but perhaps even laudatory.
Hence, she either had an excuse, or she had a justification.^9 In either case, what
is established when these sorts of pleas are warranted is that the agent in ques-
tion did not after all act from a morally objectionable quality of will. For this
reason, blaming her is not warranted. Blaming just is reacting with a pertinent
emotion when an action is in fact an expression of ill will or a lack of a sufficient
degree of good will.
Yet another category of pleas, exemptions, involve showing that a person is
in some respect incapacitated for interpersonal relationships. She is perhaps a
small child, or in some way mentally disabled. What is established when such
pleas are warranted is that a person is incapable of appreciating or complying