Strawsonian Compatibilism 133with a demand that she act with a sufficient degree of good will. Hence, blaming
her by responding to an objectionable quality of will she displays amounts to
having an unreasonable expectation.
With the preceding explanation of pleas in place, Strawson’s argument can be
stated as follows. If determinism were true, it would not provide grounds for
excusing or justifying in the ways that the first category does. Determinism
would not have as a logical consequence that any particular excuse or justifica-
tion applies universally. It would not show, for instance, that everyone who ever
acted was pushed, or was innocently unaware of what she was doing, and so on.
Moreover, no such plea could undermine responsibility tout court, since the
point of such pleas is only to show that one who is a morally responsible agent
just happens not to be blameworthy for some act or omission. Any such plea
presumes that the agent to whom it applies persists in being a person who
remains a candidate for being morally responsible for her conduct. Furthermore,
Strawson continues, determinism would not have as a logical consequence that
everyone is incapable in some respect of interpersonal relationships and so is
exempted from being held morally responsible. It would not show that it would
be unreasonable to expect of sane adults that they show sufficient good will
toward others.^10 Thus given our exculpating practices and what it is to blame—to
react with a fitting emotional response to the ill will of someone who is capable
of sufficient good will—determinism would give us no reason to respond as
incompatibilists suggest we ought were we to conclude that determinism is true.
Before proceeding, consider briefly in light of this argument how Strawson
would handle the problem facing the classical compatibilists’ account of
freedom. Doing so will bring into relief Strawson’s own positive view of
freedom. For the classical compatibilists, it seems they cannot explain unfree-
dom in acting due to defective desires, as in the case of compulsive disorders.
Strawson can accommodate such cases under the umbrella of excuses. If the
agent acts from a compulsive disorder, it does not reveal an objectionable quality
of will, and her regard for others is not impugned. When she is able to act so that
her actions reflect her regard for others—her ill will or her good will—she is, in
Strawson’s conception, acting freely.
6.4.2. The Psychological Impossibility Argument
Strawson’s psychological impossibility argument is built upon what he takes to
be a simple observation about moral psychology. It is not psychologically pos-
sible for us to extinguish or fully suppress our reactive attitudes. Susceptibility
to these emotions is a part of our human nature. But when we respond to one
who acts with ill will toward us or others with emotions such as resentment and
indignation, we are thereby blaming them. Hence, it is psychologically imposs-
ible for us to suppress universally our preparedness to blame those whom we
take to express ill will. Recall that for Strawson, being blameworthy is just a
matter of a sane adult person acting with ill will or a lack of a sufficient degree
of good will. If so, then what the incompatibilist would prescribe were we to