136 Strawsonian Compatibilism
apparent gaps in it that are hard to reconcile with other claims he makes. Most
immediately, consider Strawson’s idea that the truth of determinism would not
license any global excuse or exemption. Surely Strawson was aware of the
dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists regarding determinism and
the ability to do otherwise. A familiar excuse, one that naturally springs to mind
in this context, is “he could not have done otherwise.” Such a plea does often
excuse, and so one might ask why Strawson would not have at least acknow-
ledged this particular plea and taken up the obvious incompatibilist rejoinder that
if determinism were true, there is one excuse that would apply universally: No
one ever could have done otherwise.
It is a fair criticism of Strawson that he does not take up directly the question
of the compatibility of determinism and the ability to do otherwise (e.g., see
Ayer, 1980). Nevertheless, there is a charitable interpretation that shows how he
would handle this question (McKenna, 2005b). If we understand Strawson as
simply claiming that no excuse or justification currently on the books would
apply universally if determinism were true, then he would after all be guilty of
failing to defend his argument against a transparent objection. But if we instead
understand his deeper point to be one about what underlying rationale is impli-
cated in any excuse or justification, then it seems that Strawson has in mind a
promising answer to the preceding objection, even if he never spelled it out
explicitly. Recall that, as he understands it, what an excuse or justification does
is to show that someone does not act with a morally objectionable quality of
will. Now, sometimes when a person is not able to do otherwise, this inability
shows that when she acts, she does not act from a morally objectionable quality
of will. In these cases, Strawson can grant, the excuse goes through. But if deter-
minism were true, then the way that it would be true that no one can do other-
wise (if that would follow) would not entail that no one ever acts from a morally
objectionable quality of will. As a result, it would not then show that no one is
ever blameworthy. (In this respect, Strawson’s view yields a result similar to the
one for which Frankfurt argues in his seminal (1969) paper.^13 )
Suppose it is granted that Strawson can overcome the preceding objection.
There are more pressing problems for his argument from exculpation. Consider
the second category of pleas he identifies, exemptions. An exemption invokes
the claim that a person is in some respect incapacitated for interpersonal rela-
tionships. But here one might reasonably want to know what the capacities are
for being able to enter fully into such relationships as a member of the moral
community. Think about it from the perspective of a libertarian who believes
that persons are free and morally responsible and accordingly possess a distinc-
tive capacity of agency that requires the falsity of determinism. They may first of
all agree that being mentally incapacitated in certain ways precludes full parti-
cipation in interpersonal relationships, and that this yields an exempting con-
dition. But they would in addition contend that determinism, by defeating the
free will ability, also yields an exempting condition, and one that universally
applies. Normally functioning adult human beings, the libertarian might protest,
are not in fact defeated in having the free will ability, but they would be were