Strawsonian Compatibilism 137determinism true.^14 They might press the point by arguing that in the absence of
offering some content to what capacities are required for engaging in interper-
sonal relations as members of a moral community, we are not in a position to
judge whether, if determinism were true, an exempting consideration would
apply universally.^15
The preceding objection is not decisive. What it shows is that Strawson’s
argument for compatibilism is incomplete without further development. Indeed
various compatibilists have explored ways of lending support to Strawson on
this point. Watson (1987), for instance, has developed the idea that the capacities
required are those that enable one to understand what can be communicated to a
wrongdoer by way of our reactive attitudes. Such capacities, it might be argued,
are not in principle incompatible with determinism.
Strawson claims that within the framework of our moral responsibility prac-
tices, there is no exempting condition that would apply universally if we were to
learn that determinism is true. But here is a Strawsonian insight that contains the
basis for an incompatibilist argument for such a universal exemption. Strawson
included seeing someone as “peculiarly unfortunate in his formative circum-
stances” (66) as a condition for exemption from the class of morally responsible
agents. Watson (1987) points out that a person raised in a horribly abusive
environment, or under the pressure of powerful indoctrination, might thereby
become evil in a way that involves his showing extreme ill will toward others in
all of his conduct. And yet, he would be exempted due to this history. The
problem is, if such a consideration exempts, why is that? Is it because he is inca-
pacitated for adult interpersonal relationships? His only incapacity would seem
to be his being morally objectionable—his being evil. It seems that his having
the history he has is the cause of now being a terrible person who acts with ill
will. However, the incompatibilist will contend that if determinism is true, every
person has the history she has, and that history just will be what counts as the
source of her later agency, whether she displays any ill will or nothing but good
will. In short, if some histories are exempting as ways of giving rise to how a
person becomes the person she is and does as she does, then why not all histo-
ries? Hence, what we have in light of this objection is a source incompatibilist
worry that, contrary to what Strawson contended, is rooted in our ordinary prac-
tices of offering various exculpating pleas.
This last concern is of a piece with a collection of puzzling problems compatibil-
ists of various sorts must face, not just those who identify as Strawsonians. Some
compatibilists adopt a nonhistorical theory and deny that an unfortunate history can
of itself be grounds for exempting. If such a history resulted in some further inca-
pacity in, say, freedom or understanding, then for this reason it might exempt. But
if a person is made morally terrible by her history, so long as other compatibilist
conditions are in place, she remains responsible. This is one way one might modify
or extend Strawson’s argument (e.g., McKenna, 1998). Other compatibilists instead
attempt to distinguish between freedom- and-responsibility- defeating histories and
freedom- and-responsibility- enabling histories, and one might defend a broadly
Strawsonian thesis along these lines (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza, 1998).