Free Will A Contemporary Introduction

40 The Free Will Problem

dot itself as representing the agent’s initiation of her being the source of that act,
and in this way, acting freely. Then the line to the right of the dot is the agent’s
future that unfolds, in part, as a product of her so acting.
Using the Source Model to help represent source freedom, we can now
develop a free will problem that allows us to focus more directly on one interest-
ing aspect of freedom. Here, now, is an expanded version of F1, namely, F4:

1. Determinism is true.


2. At least some persons have free will.


3. Free will requires that an agent is able to be the initiating source of her actions.


4. The ability to be the initiating source of actions is incompatible with
   determinism.

This formulation, F4, allows us to fix upon another problem: Is determinism
incompatible with the agent’s being the appropriate source of her actions?
Each of these models and each way of thinking about free will gives rise to
distinct philosophical problems. In each case it appears that determinism is
incompatible with the sort of freedom highlighted. On the first, if according to
determinism the past and the laws render only one future physically possible,
then it seems that it is settled at the moment of an agent’s putatively free act
which branch she will take into the future. If so, the previous diagram, adjusted
to assume that determinism is true, seems misleading. Other than the path the
agent takes, the other paths should somehow be represented as closed down or
not really connected to the agent’s past and present. We could do this with a
break in the lines representing the paths not taken. See Figure 2.3.
On the second, if according to determinism the past and laws render only one
future physically possible, then it seems that it is settled in the past what an agent
does at any time, and she is not the source of her acts. Sufficient initiating con-
ditions were set in motion long before she was born. If so, the previous diagram,
adjusted to assume that determinism is true, is misleading. The act that is the
agent’s allegedly free act should be represented instead as another “+” rather

Past

X

Future

Figure 2.2