Free Will A Contemporary Introduction

The Free Will Problem 41

than as a dot, since it cannot represent a moment at which a free agent is the ini-
tiating source of her free act. The model would look as shown in Figure 2.4.
Each of these ways of theorizing about freedom can be superimposed so that
the freedom that matters for free will is understood as requiring both the leeway
facet and the source facet of freedom. But it is useful to distinguish the two, and
at least to remain open to the possibility that the solutions might turn out to be
slightly different. Perhaps, for instance, it might be established that determinism
is incompatible with leeway freedom but is not incompatible with source
freedom. The salient point here is that a solution to one problem should not be
assumed to align with the solution to another.
The preceding formulations F3 and F4 can actually be expanded yet further,
and for a useful purpose. Thus, we might further revise F3 with F5 as follows:

1. Determinism is true.


2. At least some persons are morally responsible for what they do.


3. Moral responsibility requires free will.


4. Free will requires the ability to do otherwise.


5. The ability to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism.

Past Future

Figure 2.3

Past Future

X

Figure 2.4