44 The Free Will Problem
seemingly conflicting images of the human condition, the scientific and the
manifest images. One longstanding philosophical enterprise attempts to sustain
and preserve as much of the manifest image of the human condition as possible
in the face of ever stronger challenges from the scientific image as it increases its
explanatory scope and power. It is, in effect, a reconciling enterprise, an enter-
prise of reconciling the scientific and manifest images of the human condition.
This enterprise can be contrasted with two other currents in philosophy, currents
moving in one of two different directions. One favors the scientific image and
boldly invites rejection of assumptions nested within the manifest image when
conflict arises. Another current regards with suspicion the explanatory scope of
the scientific image. It suggests that aspects of the manifest image are insulated
from the scientific image. We might call these the supplanting and the insulating
enterprises, respectively.
The reconciling, supplanting, and insulating enterprises in relation to the mani-
fest and scientific images of the human condition are reflected in other areas of
philosophy outside of the free will debate. For instance, in moral philosophy, there
are those who seek to reconcile the moral property of goodness with a naturalized
(i.e., scientific) understanding of it (Boyd, 1988; Sturgeon, 1982). There are, as
well, those who maintain that goodness can be supplanted by appealing to only
non- moral properties, that is, properties suited for the scientific image (Stevenson,
1944). There are still others who maintain that the moral property of goodness can
be insulated from accounts that are in any way naturalized (Moore, 1903).
Or consider instead the debate in the philosophy of mind about mental states
such as beliefs and desires. Some philosophers of mind embrace the reconciling
project of preserving the legitimacy of beliefs and desires while showing them to
be consistent with neurobiological explanations of human behavior (Fodor,
1974; Putnam, 1967). Other philosophers argue that appeal to beliefs and desires
should be supplanted by appeal to the neurobiological explanations found in our
best theories (Churchland, 1981). Yet other philosophers maintain that explana-
tions in terms of beliefs and desires are insulated from any naturalizing account
(Swinburne, 2014).
Consider now the various participants in the free will debate in light of the
reconciling, supplanting, and insulating strategies. Although speaking in these
terms involves generalities subject to qualification and counterexample, the
various participants in the debate might be characterized as follows: Compatibil-
ists favor the reconciling enterprise in philosophy. Incompatibilists invite either
the supplanting or the insulating strategy. The form of hard determinism or
instead hard incompatibilism favors the supplanting of the concepts of free will
and moral responsibility in favor of a scientifically oriented image of the human
condition.^11 The form of libertarianism favors insulating free will from any natu-
ralizing threat, thereby protecting an important dimension of the manifest image
from a complete scientific explanation of human conduct.^12
We wish to emphasize that the remarks in the preceding paragraphs were
meant only as generalities designed to aid in situating compatibilism and incom-
patibilism within broader philosophical currents. To correct any misimpressions,