The Free Will Problem 45it should be noted that some of the best work done by recent libertarians and
hard incompatibilists conflicts with the preceding remarks. For instance, many
recent libertarian writers are careful to offer accounts of free will that are
designed to fit with some form of probabilistic (event) causation, a form of
explanation which, they reasonably maintain, is consistent with the best natural
science has to offer (for instance, see Balaguer, 2010; Kane, 1996). These liber-
tarians will argue that they in no way seek to partition off free will from the
framework of the rest of scientific theory. Similarly, some hard incompatibilist
writers have been very conservative in their supplanting approach, making sure
to be highly selective of how much of the manifest image needs supplanting
(Pereboom, 2001, 2014). Where, previously, hard determinists seemed to suggest
that a great deal of the manifest image should go (for instance, all concepts of
human dignity and worth, meaning in life, moral truth, and more), recently, hard
incompatibilists have argued that only very little needs to be excised (the con-
cepts of free will and moral responsibility on just one understanding and some
justifications of punishment).
But despite these qualifications, these recent incompatibilists, both the
libertarians and the hard incompatibilists, are committed to the view that the
explanatory basis of free will and free action cannot be deterministic or near-
deterministic. Granted, many contemporary libertarians are cautious in account-
ing for free will in ways consistent with the scientific image. And many
contemporary hard incompatibilists reject the sort of free will required for
accountability while preserving as much of the manifest image as possible. All
the same, both of these camps are committed to the view that one plausible way
in which human behavior might be brought about—deterministically—is incom-
patible with the sort of free will at issue in the debate. Compatibilists, then, are
the most liberal in their efforts to advance the reconciling enterprise as regards
the relation between the scientific and manifest images of the human condition.
Suggestions for Further Reading
For clarification about what compatibilism and incompatibilism are, see the
entries on these topics in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Clarke, Randolph, and Justin Capes. 2013. “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories
of Free Will.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
incompatibilism-theories/.
McKenna, Michael, and D. Justin Coates. 2015. “Compatibilism.” Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/.
For other helpful introductions to the free will problem, some as book- length
treatments and others as chapters, see, for instance:
Haji, Ishtiyaque. 2009. Incompatibilism’s Allure. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview
Press.