Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

292 AUGUSTINE


creation that, mutable as it is, it can attain beatitude by adhering to the immutable and
supreme Good, which is God, and that, unless it achieves beatitude, this nature fails to
satisfy its inmost exigencies, and, finally, that nothing but God can satisfy these needs
of the angelic nature.
Now, this perversion, like every imperfection in a nature, harms nature and, there-
fore, is contrary to the nature. It follows, therefore, that what makes the wicked angels
differ from the good ones is not their nature but a perversion or imperfection; and this
very blemish is a proof of how highly to be esteemed is the nature itself. Certainly, no
blemish in a thing ought to be blamed unless we are praising the thing as a whole, for
the whole point of blaming the blemish is that it mars the perfection of something we
would like to see praised.
For example, when we say that blindness is a defect of the eyes, we imply that it
is the very nature of the eyes to see, and when we say that deafness is a malady of the
ears, we are supposing that it is their nature to hear. So, too, when we say that it is a fail-
ure in an angel not to attain union with God, we openly proclaim that they were meant
by nature to be one with God.
Of course, no one can fully comprehend or properly express the ineffable union of
being one with God in His life, in His wisdom, in His joy, and all this without a shadow
of death or darkness or disturbance. One thing is certain. The very failure of the bad
angels to cling to God—a desertion that damaged their nature like a disease—is itself
proof enough that the nature God gave them was good—so good that not to be one with
God was for them a disaster.


CHAPTER 2


This explanation just given seemed to me necessary to forestall the objection that the
apostate spirits might have received from some principle other than God a nature differ-
ent from that of the other angels. The malice of this mistake can be more easily and
speedily removed the more clearly one grasps what God meant by the words, “I AM
WHO AM” (Exod. 3:14), spoken through the medium of an angel at the time when
Moses was being sent to the children of Israel.
Since God is supreme being, that is, since He supremely is and, therefore, is
immutable, it follows that He gave “being” to all that He created out of nothing; not, how-
ever, absolute being. To some things He gave more of being and to others less and, in this
way, arranged an order of natures in a hierarchy of being. (This noun, “being,” is derived
from the verb “to be,” just as “wisdom” is from the verb “to be wise.” In Latin,essentia,
“being,” is a new word, not used by the ancient writers, recently adopted in order to find
an equivalent of the Greek,ousía, of which essentiais the exact translation.)
Consequently, no nature—except a non-existent one—can be contrary to the
nature which is supreme and which created whatever other natures have being. In other
words, nonentity stands in opposition to that which is. Therefore, there is no being
opposed to God who is the Supreme Being and Source of all beings without exception.


CHAPTER 3


In Scripture, those who oppose God’s rule, not by nature but by sin, are called His ene-
mies. They can do no damage to Him, but only to themselves; their enmity is not a

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