THREEDIALOGUES(3) 669
except a few philosophers, who do not know what they would be at? Your question sup-
poses these points are clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall think myself
obliged to give you another answer. In the meantime, let it suffice. That I tell you, I do
not suppose God has deceived mankind at all.
HYLAS: But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger. New
notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men’s minds, and nobody
knows where they will end.
PHILONOUS: Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in sense, or
in reason, or in divine authority, should be thought to unsettle the belief of such
opinions as are grounded on all or any of these, I cannot imagine. That innovations in
government and religion are dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own.
But is there the like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making
anything known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge: and, if all
such innovations had been forbidden, men would have made a notable progress in the
arts and sciences. But it is none of my business to plead for novelties and paradoxes.
That the qualities we perceive are not on the objects: that we must not believe our
senses: that we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be assured even
of their existence: that real colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures
and motions: that motions are in themselves neither swift nor slow: that there are in
bodies absolute extensions, without any particular magnitude or figure: that a thing
stupid, thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle of a body
contains innumerable extended parts:—these are the novelties, these are the strange
notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind; and being once
admitted, embarrass the mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against
these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate common sense. It is true, in
doing this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some ambages,and ways of speech not
common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly understood, that which is most singu-
lar in them will, in effect, be found to amount to no more than this:—that it is absolutely
impossible, and a plain contradiction, to suppose any unthinking being should exist
without being perceived by a mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it
should be so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country.
HYLAS: As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those are out of the
question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. Can anything be plainer than
that you are for changing all things into ideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed to
charge me with scepticism.This is so plain, there is no denying it.
PHILONOUS: You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather
ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you,
are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves.
HYLAS: Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you leave us
nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which strikes the senses.
PHILONOUS: What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the
very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon your
supposition—that matter is an essential part of all corporeal things. We both, therefore,
agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but herein we differ—you will have
them to be empty appearances, I real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I do.
HYLAS: You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that in this
you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true nature of a thing is
discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that disagreement? Why is not the same
figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways? And why should we