670 GEORGEBERKELEY
use a microscope the better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable
to the naked eye?
PHILONOUS: Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel;
neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the naked eye. But,
in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind of individual, the
endless number of confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore,
to avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought,
men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense
at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed, however, to have some
connexion in nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession; all which they
refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I examine, by
my other senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the same object
which I had perceived by sight, the object of one sense not being perceived by the other
senses. And, when I look through a microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly
what I perceived already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite
different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know what ideas are con-
nected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of ideas, the more he is said
to know of the nature of things. What, therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our
senses are not in all circumstances affected with the same appearances. It will not thence
follow they are not to be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either with themselves
or anything else: except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one
single, unchanged, unperceivable, real nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice
seems to have taken its rise from not rightly understanding the common language of
men, speaking of several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed,
there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers are owing to the
same original: while they began to build their schemes not so much on notions as on
words, which were framed by the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the
common actions of life, without any regard to speculation.
HYLAS: Methinks I apprehend your meaning.
PHILONOUS: It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real
things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is no farther real than
as our ideas are the true representations of those originals. But, as these supposed orig-
inals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble
them; or whether they resemble them at all. We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any
real knowledge. Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the
supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot all be true copies of them: or,
if some are and others are not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from the latter.
And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty. Again, when we consider the point, we
cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an absolute exis-
tence out of a mind: nor consequently, according to you, how there should be any real
thing in nature. The result of all which is that we are thrown into the most hopeless and
abandoned scepticism.Now, give me leave to ask you,first,whether your referring
ideas to certain absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not
the source of all this scepticism? Secondly,whether you are informed, either by sense
or reason, of the existence of those unknown originals? And, in case you are not,
whether it be not absurd to suppose them? Thirdly,whether, upon inquiry, you find
there is anything distinctly conceived or meant by the absolute or external existence of
unperceiving substances? Lastly,whether, the premises considered, it be not the wisest
way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious thought about