Napoleon: A Biography

pirate swayed only by low materialistic motives'. In fact Napoleon's
Europe had nothing in common with true federalism: it was a collection
of satellite states whose interests were always to be subordinate to those of
France. This was the core 'contradiction' that explained all the rough
edges in the Empire and all the passages of arms with his siblings. As
rulers, they tried to stand up for the interests of their subjects but were
crushed by Napoleon who had given them their thrones on the quite
different understanding that they would always put France first.
The heterogeneity of Napoleon's Empire was thus a product of many
things: the success of the kings in frustrating the Emperor; the need not
to offend the interests and susceptibilities of Bonaparte supporters within
the satellite nations; the obeisance paid to powerful local customs and
folkways; and the military imperatives of the Emperor himself. The
degree of harmonization and integration was greatest in the pays reunis
and least in the pays allies, with the pays conquis presenting a mixed and
patchy picture. On paper, the Empire was supposed to be unified by the
Code Napoleon and Enlightenment reforms, and it is true that some of
Napoleon's prefects did carry out reforms, introducing new agricultural
techniques, new crops, improved livestock, marsh reclamation schemes
and the building of flood barriers. In Rome, for example, the comte de
Tournon reformed prisons and hospitals, fo stered a cotton industry and
reclaimed part of the Pontine marshes.
Yet the administrative impact of France on the Empire was superficial.
On the one hand, the satellite states mirrored the French model, with
departments and prefects; the 'notables' system was also replicated, with
landed property, not hereditary status, as the basis of political power. But
by and large the local bourgeoisie resisted the full implementation of the
Code; French officials in turn largely bent with the local wind and
connived at infractions. In Westphalia Jerome allowed entails to conciliate
the nobility but, even when Napoleon forced him out, he did not replace
his officials. In Naples there was only partial introduction of the Code
because of the clash of French interests and those of the local bourgeoisie.
The so-called uniform taxation system was regressive by necessity, as the
local bourgeoisie would not tolerate anything else; when Louis tried to
introduce a more progressive fo rm of raising revenue he quickly had to
shelve his plans because of opposition from the propertied classes.
The solution usually offered to 'integration' was to pay lip-service to
the Code Napoleon and other shibboleths of unity while working out
local solutions. Sometimes this resulted in a syncretism of old and new, as
in Aragon, where the sub-prefects retained the old title of corregidores.
More often the resolution was the one familiar from twentieth-century