Latin America: an elaborate formal constitution which was systematically
disregarded. The Emperor made sure that the various elected assemblies
created by the many different constitutions were just so many talking
shops.
Napoleon's attitude to uniformity and integration was an odd mixture
of dogmatism and flexibility. He was always impatient of cultural
differences and as the years went on his determination to impose the
Code and other monolithic reforms hardened. Illyria, for instance, was a
deeply religious country still essentially in the Middle Ages, yet the
Emperor tried to govern it without the help of the clergy and even in the
teeth of their opposition. By 1810 scarcely recognizable was the man who
had boasted to Roederer ten years before of his flexibility: 'It is by
turning Catholic that I finished the war in the Vendee; by turning
Muslim that I established myself in Egypt; by turning ultramontane that
I won the Italian mind.'
Yet Napoleon was always prepared to be flexible when his military
interests were at stake. The obvious example was in Poland where,
needing the support of the traditional elite, he did not even attempt to
abolish feudal privileges. In Spain, whenever reform clashed with
military exigencies, it was the latter that won. One can even argue that the
reforms themselves were anyway dictated by military considerations.
Napoleon's aim was to mobilize resources for his campaigns more rapidly
than his ancien regime opponents, who were constrained by restrictions
which gave tax immunities and exemptions to the Church, the nobility, to
city corporations and many other bodies. Reform in the Napoleonic
Empire came about if it suited Napoleon's military purposes or if the
bourgeoisie gave it their consent; where no economic interests were
involved they often did.
The logic of integration led Napoleon towards annexation in the
pays reunis and pays conquis. Lacking a system of direct rule
through the prefects in the conquered territories, Napoleon tried to keep
control by putting his siblings in as kings or rulers; the family courts were
fu rther shackled by the presence of loyal French officials: Roederer in
Naples, Beugnot in Berg, Simeon in Westphalia. The Emperor particu
larly liked to impose his favoured generals as War Ministers, as in the
case of Dumas in Naples and d'Ebbe in Westphalia. Another ploy was to
use his marshals as de facto viceroys: Davout in Poland, Suchet in
Aragon, Marmont in Illyria.
The problem of the pays allies was more tricky, for there was little he
could do except exert pressure through his ambassadors: notable in this
marcin
(Marcin)
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