Eupatheia (εὐπάθεια): good passions or emotions (as contrasted with pathos), the result of correct judgments and virtuous
actions. Diogenes Laertius says, “The Stoics assert there are three good emotional states (eupatheia): joy, caution, and wishing . . . joy is
rational elation . . . caution is rational avoidance . . .wishing is rational inclination . . .under wishing they place goodwill, benevolence,
friendliness and affection; under caution, respect and modesty; under joy, delight, good cheer and contentment” (Lives of the Eminent
Philosophers 7.116).
Hamartanô (ἁμαρτάνω): to do wrong, err, fail one’s purpose. The verb appears twenty-eight times in Epictetus and thirty-four times in
Marcus. Also, hamartia (ἁμαρτία)—a failure, fault, error, to do wrong to another—appears three times in Marcus, notably in 10.30, when he
talks about seeing another’s wrongdoing from the standpoint of our own failings. Both Epictetus and Musonius Rufus often use the obverse as
the ideal, being free from error, anamartêtos (ἀναμάρτητος), which, although not possible, is what we should strive for (see especially
Discourses 4.12.19; Lectures 2.5.1). Since Aristotle’s Poetics, the concept had been the fatal flaw or decision that leads to a tragic demise.
The Stoics part ways with any tragic thinking, on the one hand, and, on the other, with any notion of original sin—all sin is the result of bad
habit, following common opinion, and bad judgments. Philosophy is meant to help us scrape the accumulated errors of existence from our souls.
Hêgemonikon (ἡγεμονικόν): ruling or guiding reason; ruling principle. A. A. Long says the term, meaning “suited to command,” was
borrowed from Isocrates, the Athenian rhetorician, and was taken up by the early Stoics to represent the intellectual part of the soul as distinct
from the senses (Greek Models of Mind and Self, p. 89). Long notes that by the time of the late Stoics, Epictetus had applied it even to the
souls of animals, which lack rationality (Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, p. 211), and said it means “the governing faculty of
the mind.” Hadot calls it the superior or guiding part of the soul. Marcus uses it as a unique property of human beings (especially in 12.1 and
12.33). Epictetus’s Discourses (twenty-six references): 1.26.15, 1.20.11, 4.4.43, 4.5.5. Marcus Aurelius (forty-six references): 3.9, 4.38, 5.11,
8.48, 8.56, 9.22, 9.26, 12.1, 12.33. Whereas Epictetus leans heavily on prohairesis, Marcus prefers hêgemonikon: “How does your ruling
reason manage itself? For in that is the key to everything. Whatever else remains, be it in the power of your choice or not, is but a corpse and
smoke” (12.33).
Heimarmenê (εἱμαρμένη): fate, destiny. Stoics were compatibilists about the free will and determinism question—all things are determined,
but our response is entirely our own. See pronoia.
Hexis (ἕξις): abstract noun built on echein, to have, possess; a state of mind or habit, disposition toward something; of physical
things, a natural property or tendency. Epictetus says that habits must be “first weakened and then obliterated” (Discourses 2.18.11b–14);
otherwise, they become fuel for personal destruction (2.18.4–5). See ethos.
Hormê (ὁρμή): positive impulse or appetite toward an object (as a result of orexis and our assent) that leads to action; the
opposite of aphormê. These can be irrational impulses to act or a reasoned choice to act or exert effort toward an end. Quoting Epictetus,
Marcus says that we “must pay special attention to the sphere of our impulses—that they are subject to reservation , to the
common good (κοινωνικαί), and that they are in proportion to actual worth ” (11.37). This is the second level of self-coherence that
gives rise to our actions (see chart). Marcus repeatedly ties the discipline of hormê to acts for the common good (see also 8.7) and the claims
of justice (4.22). It appears thirty-four times in Epictetus’s Discourses, three times in the Enchiridion, and thirty-five times in Marcus. Seneca
uses the Latin equivalent impetus seventy-nine times in his letters (see Moral Letters 71.32, where he says virtue resides in our judgment,
which gives rise to impulse and clarifies all appearances that give rise to impulse).
Hulê (ὕλη): matter, material. This is a very common reference in Epictetus, appearing more than forty times, usually with the analogy of the
material that craftspeople use as a way of talking about where our own focus should be, and where the evidence of our progress will be seen
in the art of living (Discourses 1.15.2). He calls external things the raw material of our prohairesis (1.29.1–4a); elsewhere he says, “The raw
material for the work of a good and excellent person is their own guiding reason (hêgemonikon)” (3.3.1). The term appears nineteen times in
Marcus; see especially 8.35, where he talks about how we can “convert any obstacle into the raw material for our own purpose.” Sometimes
used interchangeably with ousia.
Hypolêpsis (ὑπόληψις): literally “taking up” an opinion, assumption, conception, notion, understanding. Hadot translates the term
as “value judgment” and sees a movement upward into higher-level value judgments, from prolêpsis to hypolêpsis to katalêpsis. See Marcus
4.3.4b and 9.13, where he talks about how our own assumptions can crush us, so we must throw them out. He also says that “everything turns
on our assumptions” (12.22), and we should hold our power for understanding, or forming opinions, sacred (3.9). The term appears eight times
in Epictetus’s Discourses (see 2.19.13–14, where he says we hold opinions the opposite of what we should) and three times in the
Enchiridion (see 20 , where he talks about how our own opinions or assumptions are what fuel anger).
Kalos (καλός): beautiful; in the moral sense, noble, virtuous. Seneca’s equivalent term, used quite frequently, is honestum.
Katalêpsis (κατάληψις): true comprehension, clear perception, and firm conviction needed for right conduct. Hadot translates the
term as “perception” or “objective representation.” This is a prominent term for Epictetus and stands in contrast to the Skeptic’s notion that
nothing could be known with certainty (ἀκατάληπτος). Epictetus says that true progress (prokopê) is about giving assent (see synkatathesis)
only where there is katalêpsis (Discourses 3.8.4). Marcus uses the term in praising the character of Antoninus and his zeal for “getting a true
grasp of affairs” (6.30.2), as well as in 4.22, where he says every impulse should be subject to the claims of justice and keeping our
convictions clear.
Kathêkon (καθῆκον): duty, appropriate action on the path to virtue. Diogenes Laertius says that Zeno was the first philosopher to use
the term as relating to conduct in the sense of being incumbent upon an actor (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, “Zeno,” 7.108). Marcus