the rules of the game. Just as in physics a resultant is the outcome of
physical forces operating in different directions on a mass, a political
resultant is the outcome of different social forces (players) which is
unlikely to be identical to what any individual player desired.
Allison stresses among other things the importance of mutual
(mis)perceptions, the variety of stakes held by the players and the
number of different issues being considered. Because of the
complexity of the game, players’ actions are constantly focused on
deadlines which have to be met by decisions – frequently on the basis
of inadequate information. One important maxim Allison stresses is
‘Where you stand depends on where you sit’: issues look radically
different to players from different organisations or from different
levels of the same organisation. Each player, too, will have made prior
commitments to others within or without the game and have a
distinctive style of play. Another salutary emphasis in Allison’s
treatment of this model is on the ever-present potential for ‘foul-
ups’!
Although this model is formulated primarily with US foreign
policy making in mind, an increasingly strong trend in the literature
on organisations is to stress similar issues. In particular, writers like
Ian Mangham (1979) have stressed the extent to which people in
organisations pursue their own political (career, etc.) objectives, whilst
others (e.g. Karpick, 1978) have stressed that every organisation has
an environment composed primarily of other organisations. Thus by
negotiating with representatives of other organisations a more stable
organisational world can be created.
Allison’s political bargaining model should also remind us that
many policy decisions are not taken in a bureaucratic organisational
environment. Policy decisions may be taken in a legislative assembly
which characteristically works by bargaining amongst parties and
factions. The resultant policy is not a clear expression of the values of
any one group, but a temporary compromise reflecting the bar-
gaining power of the parties and the state of public opinion at the
time. Frequently, too, executive bodies from the cabinet down consist
of representatives of departments or even outside organisations, so
that policies may be modified not only to reflect experience in
execution, but also to reflect changes in the political bargaining
power of the parties concerned. As we have seen, many writers, like
Lindblom, view such ‘incrementalism’ as not only inevitable, given
POLICIES 223