The conventional view contends that luck of this sort, unlike performance-
disrupting luck, does not undermine desert (Miller 1989 , 1999 ; Riley 1989 ). In
support of this claim, it holds that to neutralize not just performance-
disrupting luck, but background luck as well, would implausibly force us to
abandon desert altogether. This is because the view underlying the commit-
ment to neutralize background as well as performance-disrupting luck is the
view that, in order to be responsible for an achievement and hence deserve on
its basis, we must have full control over the factors affecting our achievement;
but since we can never have full control over all the background factors that
affect our achievements, we can never deserve anything. Yet—the argument
continues—it is implausible to suggest that the talented athlete no more
deserves to win a race than the untalented one, just because her being a
better athlete in part depends on her having had the good background luck of
being born with great talents. As Miller puts it:
[C]ircumstantial luck may lead us to qualify our judgements about the deserts of
those who are its beneficiaries. But if we want to keep the notion of desert and use it
to make practical judgements, we cannot compensate completely for luck of the
second kind.... Circumstantial luck always lies in the background of human
performances, and only when it intrudes in a fairly clear and direct way on what
different people achieve relative to one another do we allow it to modify our
judgements of desert. (Miller 1999 , 146 )
The conventional view insists that, if we want to retain the principle of desert
as a principle of justice, we cannot insist on viewing all luck as a threat to
desert. Instead, we must recognize that some forms of luck should ideally be
screened out of people’s deserts, but that other forms of luck are perfectly
compatible with desert and justice.
2 The Laissez-faire View
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One challenge to the conventional view’s treatment of the relation between
justice, luck, and desert comes from those who hold that desert-based justice
is compatible with more luck than is allowed by the conventional view.
Defenders of this more luck-friendly view of justice insists that people deserve
benefits on the basis not just of achievements and performances, but also of
justice, luck, and desert 441