group-diVerences that are disliked by the majority of a society. Majorities can
be more or less homogeneous, but what is relevant is the fact that they are in
command of the standards of that society, standards which can be more or
less pluralistic, but which in any case deWne the status quo. Any aspects of the
powerless group, which I will call ‘‘minority’’ in a broad sense (Sigler 1983 , 5 ),
can be picked up asdiVerent, and become a mark for the majority’s deWnition
of the collective identity of the group: these aspects may be physical or
cultural traits, exclusive of the group or not, and may or may not be
acknowledged by the members of the group in question as their own. What
is relevant is not the actual content of the diVerence, but the fact that, no
matter whether its nature is ascriptive (such as race and ethnicity) or elective
(such as culture and morality), the diVerence is actually construed as if it were
ascriptive, that is as aWxed character of the group, by means of which the
group is readily identiWed and marked oVfrom others. Therefore, whether or
not the individual member has indeed the possibility of rejecting these
diVerent attributes, she is automatically socially identiWed with them, and
social perception of her identity will not easily be freed from such an
association (Young 1990 ). In this respect, incidentally, the reduction of social
diVerences to diVerences in the conception of the good, that is, to an elective
element, is deeply misleading: indeed for members of minority groups,
elective aspects of their collective identity also count as ascriptive.
The conception of toleration which I propose here implies a double
extension compared to liberal models:Wrst, a spatial extension from the
private to the public domain; second, a semantic extension from the negative
meaning of non-interference to the positive sense of acceptance and recog-
nition (Apel 1997 ). At aWrst glance, both extensions look troublesome for
liberal theory, apparently questioning the central notion of a neutral and
impartial sphere. Yet, such liberal worries are misplaced insofar as toleration
as recognition turns out to be compatible both with a revised notion of
neutrality and with impartiality (Galeotti 1999 ). BrieXy, the outline of the
argument for toleration as recognition is the following. Considering plural-
ism as the presence of several groups and cultures in the same society—
occupying unequal positions in relation to social standing, public respect,
social and political power—circumstances of toleration are thus reconcep-
tualized as produced by the majoritarian (negative) perception of traits,
habits, and practices of minority groups which are singled out as ‘‘diVerent’’
and excluded from societal standards. Such circumstances of cultural dom-
ination then develop into contests over public toleration of diVerences
identity, difference, toleration 573