This view of civil conflict and political instability may confuse cause
with effect. The factors which are presented as the consequences of state
failure, such as ethno-nationalism, social conflict, and external military
intervention, can equally and possibly more convincingly be seen as causes
of state incapacity and the collapse of hitherto effective states such as the
Lebanon before the mid-1970s. This is not to deny that the collapse of state
governance will exacerbate the social and economic forces that have
worked to undermine it.
Furthermore, instability often results from the actions of those who con-
trol the coercive apparatus of the state rather than those who control extra-
legal means of coercion, whether as criminal organizations or opposition
groups. The military is the most obvious case in point. The crisis of author-
ity comes because the coercive apparatus of the state turns against its civil
masters, not because that apparatus is so weak that it cannot resist an exter-
nal challenge to the state’s authority. The strength of the state’s coercive
apparatus has been increased by Third World expenditure on arms. Such
expenditure seems to be driven more by the political pressures which the
armed forces in developing countries are able to exert than by security con-
siderations. It tilts the balance of power and resources towards the military,
blocks the development of ‘strong and independent social and political
institutions’, and ‘results in state institutions and elite groups being bent
to the purposes of the institutions of organized violence’ (Krause, 1996,
p. 187). The strong, rather than weak, state is the source of instability.
That governments can do as much to destabilize a country as any opposi-
tion group can be seen from Zimbabwe’s recent history. In its determination
to hold on to power the government of President Mugabe has undermined
the independence of the judiciary, taken sweeping new security powers,
brought an end to a free press, encouraged illegal occupations of farms and
the murder of their owners, politicized the police, and incited Zanu-PF war
veterans to violence and intimidation against opposition supporters which
has ended in political murders, disappearances, unlawful detentions, and
assaults. The military has warned it would not serve a President with poli-
cies different to those of President Mugabe. The result has been to reduce
sections of the population to starvation level, create nearly 100 per cent
inflation, and increase unemployment.
Political institutionalization
Political institutions are important for stability in developing countries. The
significance of institutional development was first recognized by Huntington,
Instability and Revolution 241