The Old Man 399(that phrase also occurs), he or she does not get ownership of anything, but
rather possession of some things but not others. Kant thinks that a person
cannot be owned at all. At best, one person may be granted physical pos¬
session of the other person. In the case of marriage, the husband and the
wife get possession of each other, or more specifically, of each other's sex¬
ual organs, and this for enjoyment - not for procreation. Kant believes that
because each partner grants the other partner an equal right over himself
or herself, there is no violation of the personality of either partner. They
both remain free in the most important sense, and neither treats the other
merely as a thing. Kant believes, furthermore, that sexual intercourse out¬
side of marriage makes it impossible not to treat the other merely as a thing.
The husband and wife also have the duty to treat each other as beings
with moral ends. Similar considerations hold for children. Parents possess
them in "a thing-like way." Children have no duties toward their parents.
They have only rights to be treated in certain ways. They are always free.
Servants, by contrast, are part of a household by contract only. They may
be used, but they may not be used up. In other ways, they are more like
children. Much of this must certainly seem strange by today's standards.
Still, seen in the context of eighteenth-century Prussia, it is really quite
"progressive."^62 The woman's function is not clearly subordinated to that
of the man. There is mutual recognition between them. The wife's role is
not exhausted by procreation. She governs the household together with
the husband, and while her role is restricted to the household, it is of per¬
haps greater importance than any public role the husband may play.
Following the section "On Rights to Persons Akin to Rights to Things,"
Kant discusses acquisition that is dependent on a public court of justice,
namely, contracts involving gifts, lending, recovery of something lost, guar¬
antees by oath, and the "Transition from What is Mine or Yours [i.e. own¬
ership] in a State of Nature to What is Mine or Yours in a Rightful Con¬
dition Generally." In this section Kant finally explicates what he has merely
asserted earlier, namely, the transition from the private right of ownership
in the state of nature to the public right in civil society.^63
The second part of the Doctrine of Right, dealing with public right,
and particularly with "The Right of a State" (Chapter 1), "The Right of
Nations" (Chapter 2), and cosmopolitan right, seems to belong more to
what today would be called political philosophy. It is firmly anchored in
the tradition of Hobbes, Locke, and those who follow them. His central
problem is to show that the overcoming of the state of nature is in no way
arbitrary. While he does not say much about the state of nature, it is clear