4oo Kant: A Biography
that it has for him the status of a rational idea. He did not want it to be de¬
pendent on anthropological elements, like the claim that human beings are
naturally egotistical beings without a shred of sympathy. Whether his view
is defensible or not, Kant, like many more recent political theorists, de¬
rives "legitimate government from the original contract between free per¬
sons."^64 Through government, the state of law replaces ever-present latent
war with peace. The state of law is characterized by two things: (i) gov¬
ernment determines justice, and (2) government must rule by universal law.
"The legislative authority can belong only to the united will of the people"
or the original contract.^65 This idea of the original contract or the volonte
general (united will of the people) has normative force for Kant. Thus
Kant rejects special privileges for the nobility on its basis.^66 Curiously
enough, he does not think that this implies that everyone has a right to
vote, for instance. Anyone whose "preservation in existence (his being fed
and protected) depends not on his management of his own business, but
on arrangements made by another (except the state)" lacks what he calls
"civil personality" and therefore should not vote. Women, minors, and ser¬
vants are to be excluded from the united will of the people. Lampe does not
really count. Nor does anyone who hires out his labor. Independent trades¬
men, like Kant's father, for instance, do possess civil personality.^67
One of the most controversial parts of Kant's theory is his claim that
citizens do not have a right to rebel against an unjust government. Though
he believes that we have "inalienable rights," he does not think that active
resistance is allowed. Only "negative resistance" is justified. Whether his
own behavior in the censorship affair amounted to such negative resistance
may be doubted. For he thinks that this negative resistance is something
that belongs to parliamentary representatives rather than to private citizens.
In spite of his great enthusiasm for the American and French Revolutions,
Kant cannot seem to bring himself to endorse publicly the legitimacy of
revolution. Perhaps he was just too afraid of the forces of irrationality that
revolution could (and did) unleash.
Kant's views of the relation between states are informed by the same
rational principles of public law as are his views on the internal constitution
of government. He advocates a union or league of nations that would over¬
come the state of war in international politics. The "right of the stronger'
should be replaced by the "rational idea of a peaceful... thoroughgoing
community of all nations on the earth."^68 This is for him not a mere phil¬
anthropic ideal but "a principle having to do with rights," which for Kant