In order to make out an Eighth Amendment claim in
prison condition cases, an inmate must show that prison
officials acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial
risk of harm to inmate health or safety. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1977, 128
L.Ed.2d 811; Ingalls v. Florio, 968 F.Supp. at 198. The
“deliberate indifference” standard is inapplicable to cases
in which prison officials are accused of using excessive
physical force. In these situations, where the decisions of
prison officials are made “in haste, under pressure, and
frequently without the luxury of a second chance,”
Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. at 6, 112 S.Ct. at 998, 117
L.Ed.2d 156, an Eighth Amendment claim must show
that officials applied force “maliciously and sadistically”
for the very purpose of causing harm. Id.; Ingalls v. Florio,
968 F.Supp. at 199.
B. Medical Care
Denial of medical care resulting in pain and suffering
that serves no penological purpose violates the Eighth
Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97
S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). F a i l -
ure to provide medical care to a person in custody rises to
the level of a constitutional violation only if the failure
constitutes a deliberate indifference to an inmate’s
serious medical needs. Ingalls v. Florio, 968 F.Supp. at
- A medical need is “serious” (1) if it is one diagnosed
by a physician as requiring treatment or is one that is so
obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention; (2) if unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain results as a denial or delay in
giving medical care; or (3) where denial or delay causes an
inmate to suffer a life-long handicap or permanent loss.
Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
C. Legal Access
Prisoners have a fundamental right of access to the
courts which requires prison authorities to provide
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97
S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). An inmate must
demonstrate “actual injury” from the denial of access,
which is defined as a hindrance to an inmate’s efforts to
pursue a non-frivolous legal action. Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2180-81, 135 L.Ed.2d 606
(1996). Actual injury can be shown only if the legal
action is a direct or collateral attack upon the inmate’s
sentence or is a challenge to the conditions of
confinement. Id. at 355-56, 116 S.Ct. 2181-82, 135
L.Ed.2d 606. Even where actual injury is shown, valid
penological interests, such as heightened restrictions on
prisoners in disciplinary lockdown, may properly
impinge upon the inmate’s right of access. Id. at 361,
116 S.Ct. at 2185, 135 L.Ed.2d 606.D. Religious Access
When a prison regulation impinges on an inmate’s
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96
L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). The factors to consider in deciding
whether the regulations are reasonable are 1) whether
there is a valid, rational connection between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it. If not, the regulation is
unconstitutional. The remaining three factors must be
balanced together: (2) whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates, (3) the impact that accommodation of the
asserted right will have on guards and other inmates and
on the allocation of prison resources generally and (4)
whether there are ready alternatives available that
accommodate the inmate’s rights at a minimal cost to
valid penological interests. Id. at 90-91, 107 S.Ct. at
2262, 96 L.Ed.2d 64; Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398,
493 (6th Cir. 1999). These same considerations apply
when the prison regulation impacts upon the free exercise
of religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,
107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987).The Congress attempted to overrule Shabazz by
enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), but the Supreme Court ruled the statute
unconstitutional. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997).