CULPABILITYCULPABILITYCULPABILITYCULPABILITYCULPABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the adoption of the New Jersey Code of
Criminal Justice, virtually no statutes discussed the
general principles of criminal law, such as concepts of
culpability. The drafters of the Criminal Code
recognized the need for provisions on such topics as
culpability, responsibility, justification and excuse to
modernize and rationalize the penal laws. I Final Report
of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, at pp.
v to ix (1971). The new code sought to match the degree
of the offense with the actual culpability. Thus, one of
the purposes of the Code is “to differentiate on reasonable
grounds between serious and minor offenses.” N.J.S.A.
2C:1-2a(5). By sufficiently defining forbidden conduct,
the Code gives fair warning of the nature of the conduct
proscribed and creates a foundation for a fair sentencing
system. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2a(4). The Code’s general
requirements of culpability are set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-
2, and this section is central to the entire Code. See
Cannel, Criminal Code Annotated, comment N.J.S.
2C:2-2, (Gann 2000).
II. MENS REA REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1)-(4) sets forth four mental
states: purpose; knowledge; recklessness; and negligence.
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1), a person acts “purposely”
with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct
of that nature or to cause such a result. Certain crimes in
the Code (i.e., purposeful or knowing murder, 2C:11-3,
and aggravated assault, 2C:12-b(1)), have “equivalent
expressions” of moral culpability, State v. Cooper (I), 151
N.J. 326, 360 (1997), quoting State v. Bey (III), 129 N.J.
557, 582 (1992), meaning either a purposeful or a
knowing mental state will suffice for conviction. But,
with other crimes, such as the crime of attempt,
purposeful action is required. State in the Interest of S.B.,
333 N.J. Super. 236, 242 (App. Div. 2000). Hence, the
requirement of a “conscious object” becomes key. See
State v. McAllister, 211 N.J. Super. 355, 362 (App. Div.
1986). The requirement of purposeful action is required
even if the substantive crime which is the object of the
attempt requires less than purposeful conduct. Thus,
purposeful action is required for the crime of attempted
murder, even though the lesser culpable mental state of
knowingly will suffice for purposeful or knowing murder.
State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 6 (1992). See also State v.
Jackmon, 305 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 1997), certif.
denied, 153 N.J. 49 (1998); State v. Sette, 259 N.J. Super.
156 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 597
(1992).A defendant’s “conscious object” to engage in certain
conduct or to cause a particular result may be inferred
from the nature of the criminal conduct, such as where
the defendant’s attack was so brutal that the jury could
have concluded only that defendant’s purpose, or
“conscious object,” was to kill. E.g., State v. Harvey (II),
151 N.J. 117, 150 (1997); State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525,
547 (1995); State v. Bey (III), 129 N.J. at 580; State v.
Biegenwald (IV), 126 N.J. 1, 18 (1991); State v.
McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 558-560 (1990); State v. Rose
(II), 120 N.J. 61, 63-64 (1990); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J.
580, 617-618 (1989). The State also may use evidence
under Evid. R. 404(b) to prove that defendant acted
purposely. See State v. Nance, 148 N.J. 376 (1997)
(defendant’s bad conduct against third party, former
girlfriend, relevant to defendant’s motive for killing
victim about whom defendant was jealous). In a related
context, the Supreme Court has noted that there are no
legal rules as to what inferences may be drawn from the
evidence, except that it is a question of “logic and
common sense.” State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 314
(1980).Under section 2C:2-2b(2), a person acts knowingly
with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that
nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of
a high probability of their existence. Similarly, a person
acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if
he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct
will cause such a result. With respect to the result of
conduct, the Supreme Court in State v. Clausell, 121 N.J.
298, 316 (1990), ruled that the defendant’s convictions
for knowing aggravated assault could not be sustained
unless defendant knew he was pointing his gun at the
non-decedent victims or near them when he fired his gun.
However, in State v. Zeidell, 154 N.J. 417, 434 (1998)
the Court construed “tender-years-sexual assault” under
2C:14-2b, to require that defendant engage in sexual
touching “in view of” an underage child who defendant
knows to be present. The underage child does not have
to observe defendant’s conduct. Id. As with purposeful
conduct, a defendant’s knowledge that a result is
“practically certain” to occur may be inferred from the
facts and circumstances of the crime. State v. Rose (I), 112
N.J. 454, 484 (1988).