Unless the Legislature clearly indicates an intent to
impose strict liability, a criminal statute that does not
indicate the culpable mental state is presumed to include
“knowledge” as the appropriate level of culpability.
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2c(3). See State v. Sewell, 127 N.J. 133
(1992). This provision differs from the gap filler section
of the Model Penal Code, M.P.C. § 2.02(3), which
requires that a person must be at least reckless with
respect to circumstance and result elements and at least
knowing with respect to conduct elements. See Note:
“Implied Culpability Terms in an Offense Definition:
Problems with the ‘Gap Filler’ Provisions of the New
Jersey Code of Criminal Justice,” 13 Rutgers L.J. 775
(Summer 1982). In State v. Kiejdan, 181 N.J. Super. 254
(App. Div. 1981), the defendant was charged with
violating a municipal ordinance requiring the owner of a
multi-unit residential property to provide tenants with
heat. In response, the defense attempted to excuse the
conduct by showing that vandals continually frustrated
efforts to repair the heating system. The court, however,
found a clear legislative intent to impose strict liability as
part of a regulatory scheme to protect public health and
safety. It held that the code section, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2c(3),
does not prohibit penal strict liability legislation but
rather recognizes the legislative authority to enact such
legislation, provided only its intent to do so is clearly
stated. See also State v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc.,
173 N.J. Super. 290, 299 (App. Div. 1980), certif. denied,
84 N.J. 466 (1980); State v. Feintuch, 150 N.J. Super. 414
(App. Div. 1977); State v. Hofford, 152 N.J. Super. 283
(Law Div. 1977); State v. Michalek, 207 N.J. Super. 340
(Law Div. 1985).
IV. IGNORANCE AND MISTAKE (See also, DEFENSES, this Digest)
Ignorance as to whether the conduct constitutes an
offense or as to the meaning or application of the law
determining the offense is no excuse unless the definition
of the offense so prescribes. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2d; State v.
Savoie, 67 N.J. 439, 458-459 (1979). Consciousness of
wrongdoing or intention to commit a crime are not
required absent a statute clearly specifying such mental
states. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2d. While knowledge of the
criminal law is not a requisite element of an offense,
reasonable ignorance or mistake as to a legal relationship
established as a statutory element of the offense may
negate the required mental culpability. Id.; see N.J.S.A.
2C:2-4.
V. CULPABILITY AS DETERMINANT OF GRADE OF OFFENSE
When the grade or degree of an offense depends on
whether the offense is committed purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or criminally negligently, its grade or degree
shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of
culpability is established with respect to any material
element of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2e.