DEFENSESDEFENSESDEFENSESDEFENSESDEFENSES
(See also, ALIBI, INSANITY/DIMINISHED
CAPACITY, INTOXICATION,
SELF-DEFENSE, this Digest)
I. GENERALLY
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-5 provides that all defenses which
existed prior to the Code and are not covered by it survive.
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13 defines a defense as affirmative when
either the Code so provides or it relates to an offense
defined by a statute other than the Code and the statute
so provides.
II. PLEADINGS
Pursuant to R. 3:12-2, a defendant who intends to
rely in any way on an alibi, within ten days after a written
demand by the prosecutor, must furnish a signed notice
of alibi, stating the specific place or places at which the
defendant claims to have been at the time of the offense
and the names and addresses of the witnesses on whom
defendant intends to rely.
Pursuant to R. 3:12-1, a defendant who intends to
claim the defense of ignorance or mistake, 2C:2-4c;
accomplice: renunciation terminating complicity, 2C:2-
6e(3); intoxication, 2C:2-8d; duress, 2C:2-9a; entrap-
ment, 2C:2-12b; general principles of justification,
2C:3-1 to 2C:3-11; insanity, 2C:4-1; lack of requisite
state of mind, 2C:4-2; criminal attempt (renunciation of
criminal purpose), 2C:5-1d; conspiracy (renunciation of
criminal purpose), 2C:5-2e; murder (affirmative defense,
felony murder), 2C:11-3a(3); criminal restraint, 2C:13-
2b; theft by extortion, 2C:20-5; perjury (retraction),
2C:28-1d; false swearing (retraction), 2C:28-2b; or
controlled dangerous substances near or on school
property, 2:35-7, must serve written notice on the
prosecutor no later than seven days before the
arraignment/status conference and, if defendant requests
or has received discovery, shall furnish the prosecutor
with discovery pertaining to the defense at that time.
III. MISTAKE OF FACT OR LAW
A. Generally
The ignorance or mistake defense provided for by
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4 is available to a defendant who lacks the
culpable mental state required for the commission of the
crime. It is also available in certain instances to a
defendant who, while having the requisite mental state,
was unaware of the criminality of his conduct.B. Ignorance or Mistake Negating An Element Of The Offense
Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law
provides a defense when it negates the culpability of a
particular offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-41. However, if the
defendant would have been guilty of another crime had
the situation been as he believed, then the ignorance or
mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and
degree of the offense to those of the offense of which he
would have been guilty if the situation had been as he
supposed. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4b.Mistake of fact may constitute a defense to reckless
manslaughter if the mistake negates the culpable mental
state. In this case, the defendant alleged as a mistake of
fact that he believed that the gun which he fired at the
victim was not loaded. The nature of the mistake must
be carefully analyzed in relationship to the culpable
mental state required for the offense. The opinion
contains a suggested jury charge to explain how the
offered defense relates to the culpability requirement for
the offense. Significantly, when defendant raises a
mistake of fact defense, the State does not have to disprove
it beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sexton, 160 N.J. 93
(1999). Of course, the State may never be relieved of its
burden to prove each element of an offense, including the
requisite mental state, beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus,
where a defendant introduces evidence of a mistake of fact
which, if believed, would negate an element of the
offense, defendant has no burden to prove the defense.
See also Wilson v. Tard, 593 F. Supp. 1091 (1984). In
recognizing that a negligent or reckless mistake may serve
to negate the culpable mental state, this opinion calls into
question the statutory requirement that to constitute a
defense, a mistake must be “reasonably” arrived at.In State v. Pelleteri, 294 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div.
1996), certif. denied, 148 N.J. 461 (1997), the
defendant’s failure to inspect the weapon or read the
owner’s manual, either of which would have revealed that
the firearm fell within the statutory definition of an
assault firearm, was unreasonable as a matter of law, and
the trial court’s refusal to submit the issue of mistake of
fact to the jury was not error. The “reasonable”
requirement contained in the statute was subsequently
called into question by State v. Sexton, supra. This aspect
of the Pelleteri decision is dictum however, since
knowledge of the character of the weapon is not an
element of the crime of knowing possession of an assault