hospital record because a requirement that the medical
personnel actually appear in court as witnesses would be
unduly burdensome. The court in Martorelli noted that
the admissibility of hospital test reports as business
records in part depended on the complexity of the text.
Not all diagnostic findings could be admissible, only
those based on objective data where the results do not
present more than an average difficulty in interpretation.
The weight to be accorded the test is a matter for the trier
of fact and is subject to appropriate attack by the
opposing party. See also State v. Soney, 177 N.J. Super. 47,
60 (App. Div. 1980), certif. denied, 87 N.J. 313 (1981).
Law enforcement records have been liberally treated
as coming with the business entries exception. However,
this policy has been clarified by the decision in State v.
Lungsford, 167 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 1979), where
the Appellate Court held that the trial court erred in
holding that certain hearsay evidence was admissible
under the business records exception. The court noted
that while police records may qualify as business records
for certain purposes, they are nevertheless not vehicles by
which substantive evidential status may be conferred
upon the otherwise hearsay declarations. If the declarant
is not available to testify, and if the statement is not
admissible under some other exception to the hearsay
rule, then admissibility cannot be predicated exclusively
upon the circumstance that the statement was made to a
police officer who paraphrased its content in his report.
N.J.R.E. 808 addresses the issue of an expert opinion
included in an admissible hearsay statement, and is
intended to generally codify principles from Matulewicz.
State v. Benas, 281 N.J. Super. 251 (App. Div. 1995);
State v. Moore, 240 N.J. Super. 269, 282 (App. Div.
1990), aff’d o.b., 123 N.J. 457 (1991).
Applying Matulewicz, a trial court concluded that a
State police laboratory report which contains a positive
reading of ethyl alcohol in the blood of a defendant may
be admitted into evidence under former Evid. R. 63(13),
since the report was made in the regular course of
business, was prepared within a short time of the test
performed, and the methods and circumstances of its
preparation show that it is reliable and thus justifies its
admission. State v. Weller, 225 N.J. Super. 274 (Law Div.
1986). Furthermore, such a report, which gives the
results of a highly objective test, is admissible as a factual
observation of a public officer within the scope of that
officer’s duty to observe the condition reported. See also
N.J.R.E. 803(c)(8). According to Weller, no testimony
from the forensic chemist who performed the test was
necessary.
In State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div.
2001), the Appellate Division, held that a laboratory
report showing the result of a defendant’s blood alcohol
level, utilizing the same test as in Wells, was properly
admitted as a business or public record. Given the
traditional simplicity and accuracy of blood-alcohol
analysis, it was admissible under N.J.R.E. 808 without
additional testimony from the person performing the
test.The official records exception somewhat overlaps
that of business records, especially since “business”
includes governmental agencies. N.J.R.E. 801(d).
N.J.R.E. 803(c)(8), formerly Evid. R. 63(15), provides
for the admission of:Public records, reports, and findings. Subject to R. 807,
(A) a statement contained in a writing made by a public
official of an act done by the official or an act, condition,
or event observed by the official if it was within the scope
of the official’s duty either to perform the act reported or
to observe the act, condition, or event reported and to
make the written statement, or (B) statistical findings of
a public official based upon a report of or an investigation
of acts, conditions, or events, if it was within the scope of
the official’s duty to make such statistical findings, unless
the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate that such statistical findings are not trustworthy.The rule is premised on the special trustworthiness of
a statement made in the scope of an official’s duty and the
high probability that the duty to make an accurate report
has been performed. New Jersey D.E.P. v. Duran, 251
N.J. Super. 55, 65 (App. Div. 1991); State v. Hudes, 128
N.J. Super. 589 (Cty Ct. 1974).Despite the considerable overlap between the
business entries exception and the official reports
exception, the two exceptions operate in different ways.
In State v. Kalafat, 134 N.J. Super. 297, 301 (App. Div.
1975), addressing the earlier rules, the court observed:The absence of an explicit requirement for a foundation
in Evid. R. 63(15), as contrasted with such an explicit
requirement in Evid. R. 63(13), indicates that neither
the reporter nor custodian need appear to provide a
foundation for a public record admitted under Evid. R.
63(15) (citation omitted). The inherent trustworthiness
of a report of an unchanging fact by a disinterested public
official overcomes the usual barrier to its admissibility
because of hearsay.