There is a rebuttable presumption that public
officials will properly, prudently and carefully perform
their duties. State v. Hudes, 128 N.J. Super. at 602.
Absent evidence demonstrating that the test protocol
established by the State Police is not scientifically reliable
to establish that a Breathalyzer machine is in proper
operating order, the State may, subject to N.J.R.E.
803(c)(6), 803(c)(8), 807, and 901, offer into evidence
at a DWI trial a copy of the Breath Test Inspector’s
Inspection Certificate. State v. Garthe, 145 N.J. 1
(1996); see also State v. McGeary, 129 N.J. Super. 219
(App. Div. 1974).
D. Declarations Against Interest
Statements against interest are now governed by
N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25), formerly Evid. R. 63(10) which
allows the admission of:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far
contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary, proprietary, or
social interest, or so far tended to subject declarant to civil
or criminal liability, or to render invalid declarant’s claim
against another, that a reasonable person in declarant’s
position would not have made the statement unless the
person believed it to be true. Such a statement is
admissible against an accused in a criminal action only if
the accused was the declarant.
This rule does not require the declarant to be
unavailable. See State v. Barry, 86 N.J. 80, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1017 (1981). The exception is based on the
theory that, by human nature, individuals will neither
assert, concede, nor admit to facts that would affect them
unfavorably. State v. White, 158 N.J. 230, 238 (1998);
see also State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 620-21
(1999). No statement may be admitted under this rule
against a defendant in a criminal trial unless the declarant
is that defendant. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25); State v. Felton,
131 N.J. Super. 344, 351-352 (App. Div. 1974), certif.
denied, 68 N.J. 140 (1976). See Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968), where the court held that the
admission of a codefendant’s confession that implicated
the other defendant at a joint trial constituted prejudicial
error even though the trial court gave a limiting
instruction. It should be noted that this prohibition has
also been applied to interlocking confessions which were
held to be inadmissible in a joint trial. See also Cruz v.
New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987); State v. Roach, 146 N.J.
208, 224, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1021 (1996); State v.
Haskell, 195 N.J. Super. 235 (App. Div. 1984), aff’d, 100
N.J. 469 (1985).Statements by a declarant that exculpate another and
inferentially indicate one’s own involvement might be
admissible. State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 31 (1997); State
v. Davis, 50 N.J. 16, 28-29 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1054 (1968). The issue regarding statements which
only indirectly inculpate the declarant but which also
exculpate the accused was comprehensively addressed in
State v. White, supra. The Supreme Court in White held
that:a declarant’s statements exculpating a defendant should
be admitted as evidence under the statement-against-
interest exception to the hearsay rule if, when considered
in the light of surrounding circumstances, they subject
the declarant to criminal liability or if, as a related part of
a self-inculpatory statement, they strengthen or bolster
the incriminatory effect of the declarant’s exposure to
criminal liability. The circumstances that indicate that
a defendant-exculpatory statement may enhance a
declarant’s self-inculpatory statement will necessarily
vary. In this case, we recognize that although a statement
by a declarant that another suspected of an offense is
innocent may not on its face inculpate the declarant, the
statement takes on inculpatory character and subjects the
declarant to criminal liability when the declarant is a
suspect in connection with the same crime. [158 N.J. at
244].The Law Division recently held that a confession of
a third party sought to be introduced by a defendant
under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) need not be corroborated.
State v. Reed, 332 N.J. Super. 575 (Law Div. 2000).In State v. Gaines, 147 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div.
1975), aff’d o.b. sub. nom., State v. Powers, 72 N.J. 346
(1977), a number of unlicensed firearms were found in a
vehicle occupied by three persons. One of the occupants,
while speaking to a police officer, stated that the
defendant did not know anything about the weapon.
This statement was improperly excluded from evidence
when offered by the defendant. The statement, clearly
exculpatory of the defendant, was impliedly inculpatory
of the declarant because its import was that the declarant
did have knowledge of the firearms. See State v. Davis,
supra.A statement of a declarant exculpating himself does
not “tag along” with a declaration against interest unless
the two are “essentially a single, integral statement”
where the trustworthiness ascribable to the portion