Even though unexplained possession of recently
stolen property does not fit one of the express
presumptions available under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7b for a
receiving stolen property charge, the common law rule -
- which permitted an inference of guilt under these
specific facts -- can still be “invoked” in theft prosecutions
under Title 2C. State v. Alexander, 215 N.J. Super. 523
(App. Div. 1987). The inference also applies where the
defendant is in joint possession of the stolen property.
State v. Merritt, 247 N.J. Super. 425, 431-32 (App. Div.),
126 N.J. 336 (1991).
In State v. Humphreys, 54 N.J. 406, 411-14 (1969),
the inference set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:151-7 (presently
2C:39-2) of possession of a firearm by all occupants of a
vehicle was found to be constitutional.
Similarly, in State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235, 239-
40 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 22 (1977), the
inference in N.J.S.A. 2A:170-64 (presently 2C:20-8)
that an electric meter has been tampered with by a person
being furnished electricity was held to be constitutional;
see also State v. Swed, 255 N.J. Super. 228 (App. Div.
1992); State v. Fitzmaurice, 126 N.J. Super. 361, 364-
365 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 65 N.J. 562 (1974)
(inference of intent to shoplift justified by willful
concealment of goods).
In State v. Ingram, supra, the Court held that under
the statutory presumption that an accused weapons
offender does not possess the requisite license or permit
unless he establishes to the contrary, the jury may be
permitted to infer, until the defendant comes forward
with some evidence to the contrary, that the defendant
does not possess the required license or permit to carry a
dangerous weapon, thereby permitting the jury to make
such an inference without offending any notions of due
process. See also, State v. Harmon, 104 N.J. 189, 218
(1986); State v. Johnson, 287 N.J. Super. 247, 269 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 587 (1996); State v.
McCandless, 190 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1983).
In State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587 (1979), the Supreme
Court of New Jersey viewed the state’s evidence in its
entirety, of defendant’s presence in an apartment, the
heroin found in the closet, other heroin related materials
found in the apartment and the fact that known and
suspected narcotics users were seen frequenting the
apartment, and held this evidence sufficient to allow the
jury to draw the relevant inferences and determine
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
knowledge and control over the narcotics and that
narcotics trafficking took place in defendant’s apartment.
The court overruled the holding of State v. Sapp, 71 N.J.
476 (1976), since the Court in Sapp did not give
appropriate weight to the availability of the inferences to
be drawn from all of the surrounding circumstances. The
Court acknowledged the jury’s right to draw those
inferences and to consider them in their totality in
concluding that defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Brown, 80 N.J. at 599.As held in Brown, 80 N.J. at 592, and reaffirmed in
State v. Kittrell, 145 N.J. 112, 131 (1996), “a jury may
draw an inference from a fact whenever it is more probable
than not that the inference is true; the veracity of each
inference need not be established beyond a reasonable
doubt for the jury to draw the inference.” See also State
v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236, 251 (App. Div. 2000);
State v. Taccetta, 301 N.J. Super. 227, 240 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 152 N.J. 187 (1997).N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, the eluding statute, creates a
permissive inference “that the flight or attempt to elude
creates a risk of death or injury to any person [an element
of second degree eluding] if the person’s conduct involves
a violation of chapter 4 to Title 12 of the Revised
Statutes.” In a case where the motor vehicle violations are
charged to the jury, the failure to define the word injury
has been held to be harmless error because of this
permissive inference. State v. Wallace, 158 N.J. 552, 558
(1999).XIV. JUDICIAL NOTICE (See also, SCIENTIFIC
and TECHNICAL EVIDENCE, infra)
N.J.R.E. 201 addresses judicial notice of law and facts
and embodies principles contained in former Evid. R. 9
through 11. With respect to notice of facts, N.J.R.E.
201(b) states:Facts which may be judicially noticed include (1) such
specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge
as are so universally known that they cannot reasonably
be the subject of dispute, (2) such facts as are so generally
known or are of such common notoriety within the area
pertinent to the event that they cannot reasonably be the
subject of dispute, (3) specific facts and propositions of
generalized knowledge which are capable of immediate
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned, and (4) records of the court in
which the action is pending and of any other court of this
state or federal court sitting for this state.Judicial notice serves to provide a speedy and efficient
means of proving matters which are not in genuine