dispute. State v. Downie, 117 N.J. 450, 468, cert. denied,
498 U.S. 819 (1990).
“‘Courts may properly take judicial notice of facts
that may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person of ordinary understanding and
intelligence, generally known within the limits of their
jurisdiction.’” State v. Flowers, 328 N.J. Super. 205, 214
(2000), quoting Palestroni v. Jacobs, 8 N.J. Super. 438,
444 (Cty Ct.), rev’d o.g., 10 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div.
1950). Thus, in Flowers, the stolen vehicle problem in
Newark was so universally known in that jurisdiction that
it was beyond reasonable dispute, making it unnecessary
for the State to present empirical data to justify the site
selection for a roadblock checkpoint. Id. at 214-15.
A court may take judicial notice whether requested or
not, N.J.R.E. 201(c), but judicial notice is mandatory “if
requested by a party or notice to all other parties and if
supplied with the necessary information.” N.J.R.E.
201(d).
Judicial notice is often utilized in the context of
establishing the reliability of a scientific test or technique.
When a scientific device has been held to be reliable, it is
no longer necessary to have expert testimony on the issue
at every trial. State v. Downie, 117 N.J. at 468. Thus, as
long as proper procedures are followed, the breathalyzer
is a proper subject of judicial notice. Id.; Romano v.
Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 82 (1984). The same is true of
various devices designed to measure the speed of motor
vehicles, State v. Boyington, 159 N.J. Super. 426, 432
(Law Div. 1978); State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570 (1955);
State v. Finkle, 128 N.J. Super. 199 (App. Div. 1974),
aff’d o.b., 66 N.J. 139 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836
(1975); State v. Wojtkowiak, 174 N.J. Super. 460 (App.
Div. 1980), and the use of a gas chromatograph mass
spectometer to determine the nature of a controlled
dangerous substance. State v. Cathcart, 247 N.J. Super.
340, 351-52 (App. Div. 1991).
Judicial notice is a principle of evidence. Thus, a
judge’s personal knowledge should not be utilized to take
judicial notice. State v. LiButti, 146 N.J. Super. 565, 571
(App. Div. 1977). In LiButti, the prosecutor was
attempting to show how long it would take an arson
suspect to empty a five gallon container of paint thinner.
The Appellate Division held that this demonstration
should have been conducted prior to the time of
argument and was not a proper subject for judicial notice.
The court stated:
the theory of judicial notice is that where the court is
justified by general considerations in declaring the truth
of the proposition without requiring evidence from the
party, it may take judicial notice of same. It is, however
plainly accepted that the judge is not to use from the
bench, under the guise of judicial knowledge, that which
he knows only as an individual observer.Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6d, the court, when
imposing a sentence under the Graves Act, can take
judicial notice of any evidence, testimony, or information
adduced at the trial, plea hearing or other court
proceedings. The same is true with respect to mandatory
extended terms for repeat drug offenders under N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6f.A trial court in a drug case is required to take judicial
notice of a notarized signature on a laboratory certificate
of the person who performed the analysis of the substance
and of the fact that the signer is that person. N.J.S.A.
2C:35-19b.XV. PRIVILEGES
A. Attorney-Client Privilege (See also, ATTORNEYS,
this Digest)The attorney-client privilege has long been
recognized in New Jersey, and is currently embodied in
N.J.R.E. 504 (N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-20), formerly Evid. R.- The need for confidentiality is particularly
important in criminal matters. In State v. Sugar, 84 N.J.
1, 12 (1980), the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
When confronted with the awesome power of the
criminal process, a client is never more in need of
professional guidance and advocacy. In this setting, an
instinct for survival compels a defendant to confide in an
attorney. The necessity of full and open disclosure by a
defendant ... imbues that disclosure with an intimacy
equal to that of the confessional, and approaching even
that of the marital bedroom.It has also been said, however, that the privilege is not
absolute and should be limited to the purposes for which
it exists, namely the need for consultation between
attorney and client without fear of public disclosure.
State v. Humphreys, 89 N.J. Super. 322, 325 (App. Div.
1965). Thus, the attorney-client privilege will not
extend to non-privileged documents which come into the
hands of an attorney for the purpose of rendering legal
advice to a defendant. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976), the government subpoenaed the work