plan view in the trunk, and the codefendant passenger
attempted to mislead the police about the origination
point of the trip, which was outside the permissible area
of operation of the rental vehicle.
A conviction of a crime may be based solely upon
fingerprint evidence as long as the attendant
circumstances establish that the object upon which the
prints are found was generally inaccessible to the
defendant and, thus, a jury could rationally find beyond
a reasonable doubt such object had been touched during
the commission of the crime. State v. Watson, 224 N.J.
Super. 354 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 620, cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988). The mere existence of
other possible hypotheses is not enough to remove the
case from the jury.
That a defendant-passenger was in unexplained
“possession” of a recently-stolen auto, lived close to the
location of the auto’s theft, and gave police false
information upon being arrested, was sufficient evidence
to support a guilty verdict on a receiving stolen property
charge. State v. Alexander, 215 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div.
1987).
In State v. McCoy, 116 N.J. 293 (1999), however, the
Court held that where a defendant is merely a passenger
in a car he knows to be stolen, but does not “possess” it
because he lacks dominion and control over the vehicle,
he may not be convicted of receiving a stolen auto under
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7. An inference of possession can be
drawn from the surrounding circumstances when it is
more likely than not that the proven facts point to the
inferred fact of possession.
An issue similar to sufficiency of the evidence is where
the State has a duty to preserve evidence and fails to do so
because the evidence is either lost or destroyed. The
failure of the police to preserve potentially useful evidence
does not constitute a denial of due process of law unless
a defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); State v.
Dreher, 302 N.J. Super. 408, 483 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 152 N.J. 10 (1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 943
(1998); State v. Colasurdo, 214 N.J. Super. 185, 189
(App. Div. 1986); State v. Hollander, 201 N.J. Super.
453, 479 (App. Div. 1985), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 335
(1985); see also State v. Marshall I, 123 N.J. 1, 109-10
(1991). Moreover, a defendant must demonstrate that
the evidence was material. The evidence must both
possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the
evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable
evidence by other reasonably available means. California
v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984); State v. Dreher,
supra; see State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. at 108; State v.
Hollander, supra.XXXI. WEALTH OR POVERTY
Evidence that a defendant owed money to a deceased
victim is admissible to prove motive in a criminal
prosecution. State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218, 228-29 (1955).
However, there must be something more than mere
poverty to tie defendant to a crime involving the
acquisition of property. Hence, it is improper to present
evidence that a person “had no apparent means of income
and hence was likely to commit a crime for dollar gain.”
State v. Mathis, 47 N.J. 455, 472 (1966); see State v.
Martini I, 131 N.J. 176, 266 (1993), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 875 (1995); State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 427-28
(1988); State v. Robinson, 139 N.J. Super. 58, 63 (App.
Div. 1976), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 534 (1977).There is no similar interdiction with respect to
evidence of sudden acquisition of wealth. In State v.
Smollok, 148 N.J. Super. 382, 286-87 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 74 N.J. 274 (1977), the defendant was charged
with accepting bribes. The State was permitted to prove
that during the period of the bribery scheme, the
defendant made substantial deposits, some of them in
cash, in round numbers in his bank account. The
Appellate Division held that this was proper, especially in
view of defendant’s limited salary as a public servant,
since there was other evidence of defendant’s guilt.
Moreover, the court ruled that such evidence could be
admitted even in the absence of evidence tracing the
money in the deposits to the bribes. This foundation was
unnecessary to the admissibility of the evidence,
although it could be considered by the trier of fact in
determining the weight to accord the evidence. Id. If the
defendant comes forward with an innocent explanation
for the sudden acquisition of wealth, then the trier of fact
will resolve the question of the origin of the wealth.Evidence of a defendant’s affluence is not admissible
to negate a motive for the commission of a crime of gain.
State v. Wilbely, 122 N.J. Super. 463, 466-67 (App. Div.
1973), rev’d o.g., 63 N.J. 420 (1973). In Wilbely, the
Appellate Division noted the peripherical relevance of
such evidence and, relying on former Evid. R. 4,
concluded that its admission could not be justified. The
court noted the existence of both “the honest poor as well
as the thieving wealthy.”