(App. Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 667 (1989); State v.
Alevras, 213 N.J. Super, 331, 339-42 (App. Div. 1986).
Similarly, conspiracy to commit forgery and
falsifying records merge into conspiracy to commit theft,
provided the former acts are an integral part of the theft
and not part of an independent scheme. State v. Jurcsek,
247 N.J. Super. 102, 109-110 (App. Div. 1991).
However, in State v. Rosenberger, 207 N.J. Super. 350,
360 (Law Div. 1985), the Law Division sentenced the
defendant therein for both theft under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-
3 and forgery under this statute, apparently arising out of
the same episode.
The offense of passing a bad check under N.J.S.A.
2C:21-5 is not a lesser included offense of uttering a
forged check, because each crime requires different
elements to be proved. State v. Passafiume, 184 N.J.
Super. 447, 449 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 280
(1982).
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTFOURTEENTH AMENDMENTFOURTEENTH AMENDMENTFOURTEENTH AMENDMENTFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
I. DUE PROCESS
A. Burden of Proof and PresumptionsVictor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994), held that the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is a requirement of
due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial
courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them
to do so as matter of course. So long as the trial court
instructs the jury on the necessity that defendant’s guilt
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution
does not require that any particular form of words be used
in advising jury of government’s burden of proof. See also
State v. Medina, 147 N.J. 43 (1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1190 (1997) (reasonable doubt instructions must
be considered in their entirety; only those instructions
that overall lessen the State’s burden of proof violate due
process); State v. Dreher, 302 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 152 N.J. 10 (1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S.
943 (1998) (same); State v. Kittrell, 145 N.J. 112 (1996);
State v. Love, 245 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 126 N.J. 321 (1991) (trial court’s instructions to
jurors that it was their sole interest to ascertain the truth
did not dilute State’s burden of proof and deprive
defendant of due process).According to Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437
(1992), a State may presume that a defendant is
competent and require him to shoulder the burden of
proving his incompetence by a “preponderance” of the
evidence. However, a state law requiring a defendant to
prove incompetence by “clear and convincing” evidence
violates due process. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348
(1996).Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989), held that
instructions that grand theft defendant “shall be
presumed to have embezzled” vehicle if it was not
returned within five days of expiration of rental
agreement, and that “intent to commit theft by fraud is
presumed” for failure to return rented property within 20
days of demand, constituted mandatory presumptions
relieving state of proving elements of crime, in violation
of defendant’s due process rights. See also Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970).State v. Swed, 255 N.J. Super. 228 (App. Div. 1992).
Establishing that defendant obtained electrical service by
deception or other means inclusive of tampering with