electric meter, that defendant did so purposely, and that
defendant knew that services were available for
compensation formed basis for permissive inference that
person being provided with electrical service created
tampered condition, and, thus, defendant’s due process
rights were not violated.
In State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112 (1991), a jury
instruction which authorized the jury to return a guilty
verdict on passion provocation manslaughter if defendant
caused the death in heat of passion under circumstances
that would otherwise be murder, placed on defendant
burden of proving passion/provocation and violated due
process, even though jury was also instructed that burden
of proof remained on State throughout case.
State v. Walten, 241 N.J. Super. 529 (App. Div.
1990), held that a statutory presumption which
mandates a finding that the presumed fact exists simply
by proving the underlying fact offends due process
because it undermines the defendant’s presumption of
innocence and diminishes the State’s obligation to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to observe
demands of due process, the court may not accord any
greater weight than that of a permissive inference to a
statutory presumption, no matter how mandatory the
phraseology creating the presumption appears to be. See
also N.J.R.E. 303(c) (trial judge may not use term
“presumption” or “presumed” in jury instruction).
Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) held that the
due process clause does not preclude placing the burden
of proving self-defense upon a defendant charged with
aggravated murder, which is defined as “purposely, and
with prior calculation and design causing the death of
another.” Since defendant, in proving self-defense, did
not have the burden of disproving any element of the
state’s case, the burden of proving the elements of the
crime was not unconstitutionally shifted to defendant.
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) ruled that
reversal of conviction for murder is not mandated by a
jury instruction which unconstitutionally shifts the
burden of proof to a defendant by stating that a homicide
is presumed to be malicious. A reviewing court should
not set aside an otherwise valid conviction if, after viewing
the entire record, it determines that the error in question
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Compare,
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983); California v.
Chapman, 389 U.S. 1 (1967).
State v. O’Connor, 220 N.J. Super. 104 (App. Div.
1984). N.J.S.A. 39:4-50a, which prohibits driving with
a blood alcohol concentration of .10%, or more, does not
create a mandatory presumption of intoxication. Hence,
the statute does not violate due process.In State v. Ingram, 98 N.J. 489 (1985), the statutory
presumption created by N.J.S.A. 2C:39-2b was
interpreted by the Court as a permissive inference which
thereby did not violate defendant’s due process right.
Once the State proves possession of a weapon and the
accused fails to present evidence of a proper permit or
license, the State may employ the inference to establish
the absence of the required permit to sustain a conviction
under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (unlawful possession of a
weapon without a permit). Accord, State v. McCandless,
190 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1983).State v. Burnett, 198 N.J. Super. 53 (App. Div. 1984).
R. 3:12-1, requiring defendants to give notice before trial
of an insanity defense or a defense based on mental
incapacity, does not unconstitutionally burden defen-
dants’ right to contest sanity so as to violate due process.
Relying on State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3 (1965), the court
ruled that the pretrial notice of an insanity claim gives the
State reasonable time to respond to an insanity defense.B. Capital CasesIn Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994),
admission of evidence that defendant already had been
sentenced to death in another case, although that
conviction had been reversed on appeal, did not infect
capital murder sentencing proceeding with unfairness so
as to render jury’s imposition of death penalty a denial of
due process. If jurors followed state trial court’s
instructions, that evidence should have had little, if any,
effect on deliberations, as instructions clearly and
properly described jurors’ paramount role in determin-
ing sentence and explicitly limited jurors’ consideration
of aggravating factors to the four which state sought to
prove. Finally, regardless of evidence as to defendant’s
death sentence in the prior case, jury had sufficient
evidence to justify its conclusion that the four aggravating
circumstances existed.Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993), held that to
satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, capital
sentencing scheme must suitably direct and limit the
sentencer’s discretion so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action. State’s capital sentencing
scheme must also channel the sentencer’s discretion by
clear and objective standards that provide specific and
detailed guidance and that make rationally reviewable
the process for imposing a sentence of death.