Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985), held that
the admissibility of expert opinion testimony does not
violate due process, even when the expert is unable to
recall the basis for his opinion. Since defendant cross-
examined the expert concerning his lapse of memory and
suggested to the jury the unreliability of the testimony,
the trial court did not deprive defendant of due process
by letting the jury decide the weight to be given the
opinion testimony rather than excluding it.
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) ruled
the admission at trial of a drunk driver’s refusal to take a
blood-alcohol test does not violate due process. The
absence of specific warnings that the test results could be
used at trial could not be equated with the failure to give
Miranda warnings, which involve basic Fifth Amend-
ment protections. Since the police officer warned that
failure to take the test could result in a suspension of
driving privileges, defendant had sufficient notice
concerning the adverse consequences of refusing to give
consent. See also State v. Quaid, 172 N.J. Super. 533 (Law
Div. 1980).
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Due process
requires that the State provide an indigent defendant
with a psychiatrist to examine him and help prepare a
defense, if the accused makes a preliminary showing that
his insanity at the time of the crime is likely to be a
significant factor at trial. An indigent defendant is
entitled to similar assistance for the sentencing phase of
a capital case if the State introduces psychiatric evidence
concerning the defendant’s future dangerousness.
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), held
defendant’s due process right to be heard, which includes
the right to testify in her own behalf, cannot arbitrarily
be restricted by a state’s evidentiary rule which excludes
all post-hypnotic testimony.
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), held the
exclusion of evidence regarding the physical and
psychological circumstances surrounding defendant’s
confession, which bore on the issues of voluntariness and
credibility, deprived defendant of his due process right to
a fair opportunity to present a defense.
State v. R.G.D., 108 N.J. 1 (1987), held in a waiver
hearing to determine whether a juvenile is to be tried as
an adult, the juvenile defendant was not entitled to the
appointment of a psychiatrist. A due process right to an
expert will accrue when the issue is guilt or innocence and
loss of liberty is at stake, not in a waiver hearing where the
issue is the proper court to hear the case.
State v. Sanchez, 224 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div.
1988). When defendant’s inculpatory admission was
made in response to the officer’s open-ended, general
question directed at another, defendant’s due process
rights were not infringed entitling him to suppression of
the admission. This was especially true since the setting
was not custodial, the question was not related to arrest,
it is not an essential part of the investigation and it did not
call for an admission of guilt.State v. Malik, 221 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 1987)
held that due process is not offended by the admission
into evidence of the results of defendant’s urinanalysis
taken without a warrant where it was not unreasonable for
the arresting officer to believe that the delay necessary to
obtain a warrant would result in destruction of evidence.State v. Barrett, 220 N.J. Super. 308 (Law Div. 1987),
determined a defendant’s due process rights are not
infringed by the introduction of evidence on
codefendant’s direct case which has been excluded from
the State’s case-in-chief on the basis of a Fourth
Amendment violation where the evidence was obtained
through private action.F. Prisoners’ RightsWilliams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super.
197 (App. Div. 2000). Prisoners are not entitled to the
same due process rights as those guaranteed to persons
charged with the commission of a crime. Although
prisoners are not entitled to the same level of due process
rights as free persons, they are not entirely stripped of
constitutional protections once they enter prison. See also
Russo v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 324 N.J. Super.
576 (App. Div. 1999); Bryan v. Department of
Corrections, 258 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 1992) (Process
due inmate charged with serious infraction includes
notice of charges and general notice of prison rules,
offenses, sanctions and the like).Blyther v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 322 N.J.
Super. 56 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 196
(1999), explained that defining metes and bounds of
inmate’s due process protections requires intricate
balancing of prison management concerns with inmate’s
liberty. Court must afford appropriate deference and
flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile
environment. Such flexibility is especially warranted in
the fine-tuning of ordinary incidents of prison life.
Under due process standard of Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472 (1995), administrative transfer of inmate to less
amenable quarters with consequent loss of associational