rights for nonpunitive purposes constitutes ordinary
incident of prison sentence. Assignment of prisoner to
nonpunitive Security Threat Group Management Unit
(STGMU) program for leaders of violent gangs does not
require protection of full panoply of due process rights
attendant to criminal trials or even those rights attendant
to prison disciplinary hearings.
See also Allah v. Department of Corrections, 326 N.J.
Super. 543 (App. Div. 1999) (An inmate does not have
a liberty interest in being assigned to the general prison
population); Walker v. Department of Corrections, 324
N.J. Super. 109 (App. Div. 1999) (Contact-visit
termination for drug infraction by inmate did not violate
due process); Lorusso v. Pinchak, 305 N.J. Super. 117
(App. Div. 1997) (Prison work assignments are not
liberty interests protected by Due Process Clause).
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). While due
process requirements for prison disciplinary hearings are
in many respects less demanding than those for criminal
prosecution, requirements are not so lax as to let stand the
decision of a biased hearing officer who dishonestly
suppresses evidence of innocence.
Muhammad v. Balicki, 327 N.J. Super. 369 (App.
Div. 2000) held prisoner serving life sentence for first-
degree murder, who had once escaped and tried to escape,
and who had been accorded reduced custody status
under former version of regulation, had no liberty interest
in being classified under that version, forfeited eligibility
for reduced custody status only for prisoners actually
serving sentence for escape, and was not denied due
process when he was denied reduced custody status
pursuant to amended regulation, which forfeited
eligibility for reduced custody status based upon two
instances of escape or attempted escape.
Auge v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 327 N.J. Super.
256 (App. Div. 2000), determined a statutory 10%
surcharge upon purchases from prison commissaries,
which surcharge creates revenue to fund program for
victims of violent crime, does not violate substantive due
process; raising additional revenue to compensate victims
of violent crimes is a legitimate legislative purpose, and a
surcharge upon purchases of commodities by persons
incarcerated for crimes is reasonably related to that
purpose. See also Mourning v. Correctional Medical
Services (CMS) of St. Louis, Mo., 300 N.J. Super. 213
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 468 (1997) (Statute
providing for inmate copayments for medical care did not
violate inmates’ due process rights; inmates could
challenge imposition of copayments through grievance
procedures).Dougherty v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 325 N.J.
Super. 549 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 77
(2000). To ensure a parolee procedural due process,
Parole Board must adhere to its rules regarding
preliminary and final revocation hearings, rather than
disregard them. Due process requires prompt
preliminary hearing to determine whether there is
probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe that
parolee has committed acts which would constitute
violation of parole conditions, and also requires a hearing
prior to final decision to revoke parole.Curry v. New Jersey Parole Bd., 309 N.J. Super. 66
(App. Div. 1998), concluded penalizing defendant for
exercising right to appeal, or threat of penalty for
exercising that right, is a flagrant violation of Fourteenth
Amendment.Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). States, by
adopting prison regulations, may, under certain
circumstances, create liberty interests which are
protected by due process clause. Due process liberty
interests created by prison regulations will be generally
limited to freedom from restraint which, while not
exceeding sentence in such unexpected manner as to give
rise to protection by due process clause of its own force,
nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on
inmate in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life.Wakefield v. Pinchak, 289 N.J. Super. 566 (App. Div.
1996). In prison disciplinary proceeding, due process
requires that prison’s interest in confidentiality of
evidence against inmate not be applied categorically or as
absolute; need for confidentiality must be particularly
evaluated in every case because, to extent charged inmate
is denied access to any information bearing upon pending
charges, limits are placed on his or her ability to defend
against those charges.Engel v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 270 N.J.
Super. 176 (App. Div. 1994). Disciplinary proceeding in
which prisoner was found guilty of planning escape
violated prisoner’s limited procedural due process rights,
where adjudication was based exclusively on information
provided to prison investigators by single confidential
informant, where there was no corroboration of
informant’s statements and where informant’s allega-
tions were presented to hearing officer in form of hearsay.
In such circumstances, considerations of minimal due