process required that prisoner be allowed to take
polygraph test.
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), held due
process allows mentally ill inmate to be treated
involuntarily with antipsychotic drugs where there is a
determination that the inmate is dangerous to himself
and others and that the treatment is in his medical
interest, but forcing antipsychotic drug on a convicted
prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overriding
justification, and at least as much protection as also
provided to persons detained for trial. Due process would
have been satisfied in connection with administration of
antipsychotic drugs to defendant during trial if state
court had found that treatment was medically
appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives,
essential for the sake of defendant’s own safety or the
safety of others. See also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210 (1990).
Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.
454 (1989). In order to create a protected liberty interest
in the prison context, state regulations must use explicitly
mandatory language in connection with the establish-
ment of specific substantive predicates to limit official
discretion, and thereby require that a particular outcome
be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have
been met. Kentucky prison regulations containing a list
of types of visitors who might be excluded from visitation
did not give inmates a liberty interest protectable by the
due process clause in receiving visitors.
State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113 (1988) concluded
temporary imprisonment in county jail pending
admission to the ADTC to which he was sentenced as a
repetitive sex offender with the resultant delay in
treatment did not constitute a violation of defendant’s
due process rights.
Gerardo v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 221 N.J. Super. 442
(App. Div. 1987) held a five day delay in holding a parole
recission hearing does not violate an inmate’s due process
rights where the delay was not unreasonable and the
inmate was not prejudiced by the delay. Thus, the
inmate was not entitled to automatic release when his
hearing was not held within 60 days.
New Jersey State Parole Bd. v. Manson, 220 N.J. Super.
566 (App. Div. 1987). Neither defendant’s due process
rights nor principles of fundamental fairness were
violated by the reconvening of a parole revocation hearing
before the hearing officer since there had been no final
determination and no adjudication on merits.
Artway v. Commissioner, Department of Corrections,
216 N.J. Super. 213 (App. Div. 1987). There was no
denial of defendant-sex offender’s due process rights
when he was transferred back to ADTC after he had first
been transferred from ADTC to the general prison
population, because defendant’s record had been
reviewed prior to the decision and the transfer was not
effected solely to avoid resentencing defendant pursuant
to the new Code of Criminal Justice.State v. Gillespie, 225 N.J. Super. 435 (Law Div.
1987), concluded an inmate’s due process rights are not
infringed by prison authorities by the seizure of sexually
explicit photographs from an envelope addressed to the
inmate, as the regulations involving such seizure were
unambiguous and provided inmates with procedural
safeguards.According to White v. Fauver, 219 N.J. Super. 170
(App. Div. 1987), the reclassification of an inmate’s
custodial status as the result of change in policy rather
than as a result of any activity on the inmate’s part did not
violate the inmate’s due process rights. The inmate had
no constitutionality protected “liberty interest” in his
status as long as his status was within the sentence
imposed and did not otherwise violate the Constitution.
Nor did the inmate have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to the reduced status such as to constitute a protectable
right.Matter of Commitment of J.L.J., 196 N.J. Super. 34
(App. Div. 1984). The preponderance of the evidence
standard to justify the continuing commitment of former
criminal defendants found not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGI) does not violate the Constitution.
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8b(3). Relying on Jones v. United States,
463 U.S. 354 (1983), the court found no due process
violation since the State retained the burden of
demonstrating that the individual remained mentally ill
and dangerous. The court also found no equal protection
violation because NGIs, as a class, were distinguishable
from those civilly committed, who were less likely to be
dangerous than individuals who had been previously
involved with the law. Accord, In re A.L.U., 192 N.J.
Super. 480 (App. Div. 1984).G. Prosecutorial ConductIn Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), the
Supreme Court set forth the principle that due process
bars the State from obtaining an indictment for more
serious charges after a defendant has sought a trial de novo
following the successful appeal of a lesser conviction. The