expressed goal of protecting children. Additionally,
defendant’s due process rights were not violated despite
the fact that the statute did not require knowledge of the
proximity of the school. Accord, State v. Brown, 227 N.J.
Super. 429 (Law Div. 1988).
State v. Passante, 225 N.J. Super. 439 (Law Div.
1987), held the New Jersey RICO statute was not void
for vagueness because the statute employed the generic
term “gambling” to denote types of gambling activity.
When the conduct prohibited is not fairly susceptible of
definition in other than general terms, there is no
constitutional impediment to use of the general
language. It was also not unconstitutionally overbroad
because it only provided enhanced criminal and civil
sanctions for conduct already prohibited by federal and
state law.
In State v. Harris, 218 N.J. Super. 251 (Law Div.
1987), the court determined that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1,
which defines weapons, was unconstitutionally vague as
applied to stun guns prior to a 1985 amendment which
specifically included them. The statute did not give fair
notice that the guns were illegal as the language was
unclear whether stun guns were included within the
definition of “weapons.”
In Allen v. Bordentown, 216 N.J. Super. 557 (Law
Div. 1987),a local curfew ordinance which prohibited all
minors from being in a public place between 9:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m. every day with only severely limited
exceptions was held to be overbroad. The court found
that the ordinance contained unnecessarily sweeping
restrictions of the fundamental liberties of both adults
and children, including freedom of speech, assembly and
religion and the right to travel. The purpose of the
ordinance could have been achieved by less drastic means
which would not have infringed constitutional rights.
Tri-State Metro Naturists v. Township of Lower, 219
N.J. Super. 99 (Law Div. 1986), determined that a
municipal ordinance which banned public nudity was
not void for vagueness where the language of the
ordinance was specific as to nudity although arguably
vague with respect to “indecent or lewd dress.”
State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. 354 (App. Div. 1984),
concluded that the manslaughter statute was not
unconstitutionally overbroad. The court noted that
overbreadth attacks involve First Amendment rights, and
that the statute did not reach any constitutionally
protected conduct.
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984), explained that a party may not facially
challenge an allegedly overbroad statute on behalf of
third parties whose conduct may or may not be
constitutionally protected, unless it shows that the
statute will have a real and substantial effect on the free
speech rights of those persons not before the court.In Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85
(1983), New Jersey’s Drug Paraphernalia Act, N.J.S.A.
24:21-46 to 53, withstood a constitutional challenge
from retailers of drug paraphernalia (“head shop”
operators), claiming the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad and void for vagueness. Rejecting the
overbreadth contention, the court said that the doctrine
did not apply to commercial speech and that the head
shop operators lacked standing to assert the commercial
speech rights of others. Applying statutory construction
principles, the court clarified the definition of drug
paraphernalia, and interpreted the retailer’s knowledge
requirement. The statute then was determined not to be
facially void, since retailers could conform their conduct
to the statute’s proscriptions, and law enforcement
officers had sufficient guidelines to preclude arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.J. MiscellaneousDickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 120 S.Ct.
2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). Miranda’s warning-
based approach to determining the admissibility of a
statement made by an accused during custodial
interrogation is constitutionally based, and can not be, in
effect, overruled by legislative act. There are two
constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession
must be voluntary in order to be admitted into evidence,
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.U.S. v. Martinez-Salazar, 120 S.Ct. 774 (2000),
held defendant’s due process rights were not violated
when he exercised peremptory challenge to remove a
potential juror after the district court erroneously refused
to dismiss the potential juror for cause. Defendant
received precisely what federal law provided when he was
accorded the exact number of challenges allowed in his
case under rule governing peremptory challenges.
Although the peremptory challenge plays an important
role in reinforcing a defendant’s constitutional right to
trial by an impartial jury, such challenges are auxiliary;
unlike the right to an impartial jury guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, peremptory challenges are not of