federal constitutional dimension. See also Ross v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145
L.Ed. 2d 736 (2000). As a practical matter, the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment largely converge to require that a state’s
procedure affords adequate and effective appellate review
to indigent defendants, and a state’s procedure provides
such review so long as it reasonably ensures that an
indigent’s appeal will be resolved in a way that is related
to the merit of that appeal. Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614 (1998) explained that a plea does not qualify as
“intelligent” unless a criminal defendant first receives real
notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the
first and most universally recognized requirement of due
process. See also State v. Garcia, 320 N.J. Super. 332
(App. Div. 1999).
State v. P.Z, 152 N.J. 86 (1997). If defendant’s
statement was product of essentially free and
unconstrained choice, statement was made “voluntarily”
and may be used against defendant, but if defendant’s
will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired, use of statement offends due process;
issue can be resolved only after assessment of totality of
circumstances surrounding statement. Test for
voluntariness of statement, for purposes of determining
whether use of statement is barred by due process, is
much like test used to determine whether defendant is in
custody under Fifth Amendment, except that
voluntariness review includes consideration of both
characteristics of accused and details of interrogation.
State v. Bisaccia, 319 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1999),
held “due process” does not require a new trial every time
a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising
situation, but rather, a jury capable and willing to decide
the case solely on the evidence before it and a trial judge
ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to
determine the effect of such occurrences when they
happen. See also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997);
State v. Dreher, 302 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 152 N.J. 10 (1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 943
(1998).
State v. McCague, 314 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 157 N.J. 542 (1998). Mens rea is not a
constitutional prerequisite to enforcement of criminal
statute as long as fundamental justice is not offended such
as when the conduct proscribed was so blameless as to
trap the unknowing or unwary. Prosecution of members
of nonprofit organization operating needle exchange
program, for furnishing or giving hypodermic needle or
syringe to another, did not violate due process, even if
police chief did not threaten organization members with
arrest and told newspaper that program’s goals were
admirable; whatever the prior statements of police chief,
members were not immune to enforcement of the law,
and prosecution for clear statutory violation could not in
any sense be considered violative of fundamental fairness
or shocking to a sense of justice.State v. Burgess, 154 N.J. 181 (1998), held proper
explanation of elements of crime is crucial to satisfaction
of defendant’s due process rights.State v. Ortisi, 308 N.J. Super. 573 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 156 N.J. 383 (1998). Allowing trial to proceed
in pro se defendant’s absence without requiring standby
counsel to defend did not deny defendant effective
assistance of counsel, meaningful trial by jury, or due
process of law; defendant had voluntarily absented
himself from trial and instructed standby counsel only to
take notes, and, since standby counsel objected when he
believed it was appropriate and made requests on
defendant’s behalf despite this admonition and judge
protected defendant’s rights by objecting himself to
improper questions and evidence, integrity of trial
process was preserved.United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995). Due
process clause and Sixth Amendment right to jury trial
required trial judge to submit to jury question of
materiality of defendant’s allegedly false statements in
matter within jurisdiction of federal agency; defendant
had right to demand that jury find him guilty of all
elements of crime, and materiality was element of crime.
See also State v. Anderson, 127 N.J. 191 (1992).State v. Mello, 297 N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div.
1997)., held that although the United States
Constitution does not impose on states the requirement
of indictment by grand jury, Sixth Amendment
guarantees right to be informed of nature and cause of
accusation and due process clause requires reasonable
notice and information of specific charge. See also
Application of Hart, 265 N.J. Super. 285 (Law Div.
1993).State v. Dishon, 297 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 149 N.J. 144 (1997), opined defendant has
constitutional right to be present at every critical stage of
his or her trial, including the impaneling of the jury; right
to be present is derived from the Sixth Amendment
confrontation clause, the due process clause of the Fifth