verdict is more accurately characterized as due process
right than as one under the Sixth Amendment. See also
State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628 (1991).
In Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991), the
trial judge’s refusal to question prospective jurors about
specific contents of news reports to which they had been
exposed did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury or his right to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment, where court asked entire
venire of jurors four separate questions about effect on
them of pretrial publicity or information obtained by
other means, and court then conducted further voir dire
in panels of four, and each time individual juror indicated
that he acquired knowledge of facts from outside sources,
juror was asked whether he had formed an opinion.
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) held
introduction of testimony of victim of house burglary
that defendant was involved in that burglary did not
violate due process test of fundamental fairness, even
though defendant was acquitted of charges arising out of
house burglary, particularly as trial judge gave limiting
instructions and twice told jury of defendant’s prior
acquittal.
State v. Muniz, 118 N.J. 319 (1990), decided charge
that makes jury aware of lesser-included motor vehicle
offenses in prosecution for death by auto would address
due process concerns about defendant not having
opportunity to have jury consider guilt on lesser-
included offenses.
In State v. Vassos, 237 N.J. Super. 585 (App. Div.
1990), the trial court’s interruption of key defense
witness’ trial testimony to warn him that it could subject
him to prosecution for perjury, and the court’s
subsequent striking of witness’ testimony when he
refused to continue testifying, violated burglary
defendant’s due process right to fair trial; giving of
testimony which prosecutor or court considered to be
perjured was not valid basis for warning witness about his
privilege against self-incrimination.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Claim
that law enforcement officials have used excessive force,
deadly or not, in course of arrest, investigatory stop or
other “seizure” of a person is properly analyzed under
Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” stan-
dard, rather than under substantive due process
standard.
State v. Bulu, 234 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div.
1989),held imposition of drug enforcement and demand
reduction penalties as condition of entry into Pretrial
Intervention Program (PTI) does not violate procedural
due process; procedural safeguards built into the PTI
system are more than sufficient to satisfy the notice and
hearing requirements of procedural due process.In State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330 (1989), the trial
court’s refusal to permit attorney-conducted voir dire did
not violate defendant’s rights to impartial jury, to
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, or to due
process.State v. Gonzalez, 114 N.J. 592 (1989), explained
that determining what process is due to suspect
necessitates analysis of underlying factors and
circumstances, including not only threat to suspect’s
liberty but also hindrance of law enforcement that
process would create.New Jersey Ass’n of Ticket Brokers v. Ticketron, 226
N.J. Super. 155 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 364
(1988), ruled State antiticket-scalping statute satisfied
due process under both State and Federal Constitutions;
statute addressed abuses found to exist in reselling of
tickets, was reasonably related to proper legislative
purpose, and promoted public welfare without
discrimination or arbitrariness.McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429
(1988). The State-imposed requirement that a court
appointed attorney who wishes to withdraw as appellate
counsel, on the ground that the appeal is wholly
frivolous, include a discussion why the issues lack merit
does not violate his client’s due process rights. The
discussion is no more burdensome than the conclusion
itself. The explanation requirement assures that counsel
has protected his client’s rights by necessitating a zealous
review of the record. Moreover, the discussion
requirement is of assistance to the court in determining
the motion and may forestall precipitous motions to
withdraw.Kirk v. City of Newark, 109 N.J. 173 (1988), held an
officer-defendant is entitled to qualified immunity in a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action claiming that plaintiff was
deprived of his due process rights by the arrest because it
has been clearly established by law that once the officer
reasonably believes probable cause to arrest exists, the
officer must exercise due diligence before effecting the
arrest.