Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). Refusal of
Texas, which requires new trial motion based on newly
discovered evidence to be made within 30 days of
imposition or suspension of sentence, to entertain
murder defendant’s new evidence claim eight years after
his conviction did not violate principle of fundamental
fairness, and thus did not violate due process, given
Constitution’s silence on subject of new trials, historical
availability of new trials based on newly discovered
evidence, federal criminal procedure rule imposing time
limit for filing new trial motions based on newly
discovered evidence, and contemporary practice of States,
only nine of which had no time limits for filing of such
motions.
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992)
explained the effect of delay between formal accusation
and trial on adjudicative accuracy is not exclusively
matter for consideration under Due Process Clause;
rather, once triggered by arrest, indictment, or other
official accusation, speedy trial inquiry must weigh effect
of delay on accused’s defense just as it has to weigh any
other form of recognized prejudice. Defendant may
invoke due process to challenge delay both before and
after official accusation. See also State v. Alexander, 310
N.J. Super. 348 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 408
(1999) (Actual prejudice, not possible or presumed
prejudice, is required to support claim that pre-
indictment delay violated defendant’s due process
rights); State v. Little, 296 N.J. Super. 573 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 150 N.J. 25 (1997) (same); State v. Aguirre,
287 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 145 N.J.
585 (1996).
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510
U.S. 43 (1993) held absent exigent circumstances, the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
requires the government in a civil forfeiture proceeding to
afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard
before seizing real property.
State v. Bzura, 261 N.J. Super. 602 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 133 N.J. 433 (1993). For purposes of
determining whether jury verdict is unanimous when
defendant is alleged to have committed separate acts, any
one of which could constitute offense charged, when
applying test of whether statute recognizes that single
offense may be committed by different means and that
those means are not so disparate as to exemplify two
inherently different offenses, historical and contempo-
rary acceptance of state’s definition of offense and verdict
practice is strong indication that they do not offend due
process.
State v. Sette, 259 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 130 N.J. 597 (1992) held it does not violate due
process to require a defendant to bear the burden of
proving a justification or excuse defense, so long as the
jury considers the same evidence as it bears on the basic
elements of the crime; if evidence of an excuse such as
insanity is inadequate to meet a defendant’s burden of
proof to establish a complete defense, jury must be
permitted to also consider that evidence in deciding
whether the State has proved the elements of the charge.In State v. Paige, 256 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div.
1992), the trial court’s failure to sua sponte dismiss an
indictment after second hung jury did not violate due
process in prosecution for first-degree robbery and
aggravated assault; eyewitness who could identify
defendant surfaced after second trial, although
eyewitness did not testify at third trial, and outcome of
deliberations of hung juries was unknown.State v. Kamienski, 254 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 (1992), held voir dire of
prospective jurors without them being sequestered did
not deprive defendant of due process in criminal case,
even though prospective jurors’ views were expressed
from jury box and were heard by others, and even though
better practice would have been to have prospective juror
privately inform judge and counsel of any personal reason
for not being fair and impartial; trial judge hammered
home point that verdict had to be based on evidence, and
the allegedly damaging responses related to experiences
of family members with drug problems.State v. Falcone, 254 N.J. Super. 492 (Law Div. 1992)
determined defendant’s due process rights were violated
when court permitted defendant to waive counsel and
proceed pro se to try case, despite his limited facility in use
of English language, then fined defendant, and
incarcerated him for ten days and suspended his license
beyond allowable maximum for driving with suspended
license.Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991) held due
process clause does not require that in federal
prosecution, general guilty verdict on multiple-object
conspiracy charge must be set aside if evidence is
inadequate to support conviction as to one object.According to Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991),
conviction of first-degree murder under instructions that
did not require jury to agree on one of alternative theories
of premeditated and felony-murder did not deny due
process. Criminal defendant’s right to unanimous