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INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ONINTERSTATE AGREEMENT ONINTERSTATE AGREEMENT ONINTERSTATE AGREEMENT ONINTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON

DETAINERS DETAINERS DETAINERS DETAINERS DETAINERS (I.A.D.)(I.A.D.)(I.A.D.)(I.A.D.)(I.A.D.)

(See also, EXTRADITION, this Digest)

I. CONSTRUCTION, PURPOSE AND NATURE

OF THE AGREEMENT

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (N.J.S.A.
2A:159A-1 et seq.) was adopted to expeditiously dispose
of outstanding charges, indictments, informations or
complaints pending against persons imprisoned in
another state in order to implement the right to a speedy
trial and to minimize interference with a prisoner’s
treatment and rehabilitation. The IAD is a compact
entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the
District of Columbia to establish procedures for
resolution of one state’s outstanding charges against a
prisoner of another state. See N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1 et. seq;
State v. Millett, 272 N.J. Super. 68, 102 (App. Div. 1994).
A state seeking to bring charges against a prisoner in
another state’s custody begins the process by filing a
detainer, which is a request by the state’s criminal justice
agency that the institution in which the prisoner is
housed hold the prisoner for the agency or notify the
agency when release is imminent. Fex v. Michigan, 507
U.S. 43, 44, 113 St. Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed. 2 d 406 (1993).
After a detainer has been lodged against him, a prisoner
may file a “request for a final disposition to be made of the
indictment, information, or complaint.” N.J.S.A.
2A:159A-3a. Upon such a request, the prisoner “shall be
brought to trial within one hundred eighty days,”
“provided that for good cause shown in open court, the
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having
jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance.” Ibid.

Resolution of the charges can also be triggered by the
charging jurisdiction, which may request temporary
custody of the prisoner for that purpose. N.J.S.A.
2A:159A-4a. In such a case, “trial shall be commenced
within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the
prisoner in the receiving state,” subject again to
continuances for good cause shown in open court.
N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-4c. If a defendant is not brought to
trial within the applicable statutory period, the IAD
requires that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice.
N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-5c. The IAD was drafted to remedy
problems associated with long-standing and dormant
detainers such as stricter custodial supervision, loss of
favorable work assignments, and general uncertainty
about one’s future freedom. State v. Moreau, 287 N.J.
Super. 179, 186-187 (Law Div. 1995).

It is important to note that the IAD does not apply

to all cases where there are outstanding charges. Rather,

a formal detainer must be filed by a state against an

inmate before the inmate may invoke the provisions of the

IAD. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct.

1834 , 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). A “detainer”

contemplated by the IAD is “a notification filed with the

institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence,

advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal

charges in another jurisdiction.” Carchman v. Nash, 473

U.S. 716, 729, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985).

The IAD does not require a state to file a detainer

against a prisoner in the first instance. The purpose of the

statute is not to ensure the speedy disposition of every

charge, or even of those charges which potentially could

form the basis for a detainer being lodged. State v.

Johnson, 269 N.J. Super. 276, 287 (App. Div. 1993),

certif. denied, 136 N.J. 296 (1994) (holding that New

Jersey did not violate the IAD when it abandoned a

previous detainer and no detainer existed when

defendant attempted to assert his rights under the IAD).

Since the purpose of the IAD is remedial, it should be

accorded liberal construction in favor of prisoners within

its purview. State v. Lippolis, 101 N.J. Super. 435 (Law

Div. 1968), aff’d, 107 N.J. Super. 137 (App. Div. 1969),

rev’d o.g., 55 N.J. 354 (1970).

II. MECHANICS OF THE AGREEMENT

A. Article III

Under Article III, the State must bring a defendant

to trial “[w]ithin 180 days after he shall have caused to be

delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate

court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written

notice of the place of his imprisonment....” The running

of the 180 day period is not triggered by the mere

execution and delivery of these documents to the warden

or other official having custody of the defendant. Rather,

the period begins to run only upon actual receipt of the

notice and request by the prosecutor and the court. State

v. Ternaku, 156 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 1978), certif.

denied, 77 N.J. 478 (1978). Defendant, however, is

neither responsible for the inaction of prison officials nor

for administrative failures, and the 180 day period should

commence shortly after the request is made by defendant.

State v., Wells, 186 N.J. Super. 497 (App. Div. 1982); Cf.

N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3b (appropriate corrections official

shall promptly forward defendant’s written notice and

request to final disposition). Nor will defendant be

denied relief under Article III where he was misled and