in allowing the jury to double count the evidence of the
level of the defendant’s state of intoxication (blood test
results = 0.382%) as an aggravating factor in imposing
sentence for aggravated assault. The court stated that
since the defendant could have been tried and convicted
for a DWI offense, based upon the blood test result, the
presence of a high blood-alcohol level did not necessarily
equate to reckless behavior that manifested an extreme
indifference to the value of human life.
VIII. HITCHHIKING
State v. Trotwood, 143 N.J. Super. 518 (Law Div.
1976), aff’d 150 N.J. Super. 115 (App. Div. 1977), app.
dism. 75 N.J. 592 (1977), upheld the constitutionality
of the statute barring hitchhiking (N.J.S.A. 39:4-59).
Defendant’s right to travel is not absolute when balanced
against the State’s duty to promulgate measures directed
toward the safe use of its highways. The hitchhiking
statute is a proper legislative enactment directed to a
matter of public concern, i.e., traffic safety, within the
domain of the police power. Furthermore, defendant’s
right to equal protection was not violated since (1) no
class of people was discriminated against, and 2) there
was no absolute ban on the right to travel because the
statute only prohibited solicitation of rides “in the
highway.” The Appellate Division also noted that the
statute neither vested unlimited discretionary powers in
the police regarding the enforcement of its provisions nor
prohibited the otherwise legal act of picking up
hitchhikers on non-highways.
IX. IDENTIFICATION
According to State v. Rondinone, 300 N.J. Super. 495
(App. Div. 1997), where defendant presented a third
party’s drivers license at the scene of accident, the Law
Division had duty to amend the complaint to correctly
identify defendant with respect to the drunk driving
charge and could include other charges of which he was
convicted. Defendant’s conviction for exhibiting
another’s drivers license merged with conviction for
falsifying or tampering with records. The Appellate
Division affirmed, holding that the DWI conviction was
not reversible on statute of limitations grounds, even
though the summons in defendant’s name was not issued
until more than 30 days after the infraction.
State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14 (1987), held that a
defendant who gave a false name in response to an inquiry
by a law enforcement officer did not “volunteer false
information,” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3.
This decision has effectively been superseded by the
enactment of an amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3a(7)
and 2C:29-3b, which changed the language of the
statute from “volunteering” false information to police, to
“giving” false information to police.X. JURISDICTION
State v. Ryfa, 315 N.J. Super. 376 (Law Div. 1998),
affirmed both the municipal court’s amendment of a
driving while intoxicated complaint to set forth the
correct town where the offense had occurred and its
transfer to the proper municipal court. The municipal
court was not bound only to dismiss the complaint, but
had the broad power pursuant to R. 7:10-2, caselaw, and
common sense to amend it to reflect the offense’s
undisputed locale and to transfer it to the correct
municipality where that offense had taken place.State v. Panther Valley Property Owners Assoc., 307
N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 1998), affirmed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment, which had
determined that a private property owners’ association
that cedes authority to the State to enforce the motor
vehicle laws has no power to thereafter impose fines for
violations of those laws. While the association originally
had the authority to maintain and administer the
community’s common property, such as roads, by having
the surrounding township assume jurisdiction over
motor vehicle violations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1,
the association gave up the ability to assess fines for such
violations. The county prosecutor had standing to
challenge the association’s practice of fining violators
because he was the chief law enforcement officer and had
the power to enforce the motor vehicle laws within his
jurisdiction.State v. Garcia, 297 N.J. Super. 108 (Palmyra Mun.
Ct. 1996), provides a comprehensive and detailed
discussion, including the historical roots of the interstate
compact, of the jurisdictional authority concerning
bridges over the Delaware River. The case arose as a result
of motor vehicle charges against Mr. Garcia for careless
driving and leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident
which had occurred on a bridge over the Delaware River.
Although the direct impact of the decision is limited to
bridges under the control of the Burlington County
Bridge Commission, and its precedential value may be
limited, the opinion suggests that jurisdictional issues on
other Delaware River crossings may be subject to
resolution under the same analysis. The court concluded
that it could exercise jurisdiction over careless driving and
leaving scene of accident offenses which occurred on a
bridge owned and operated by county bridge authority