over waters of Delaware River but not for offenses which
occur over dry land of another state.
XI. MOPEDS
N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.3q requires any person operating a
motorized bicycle to wear a protective helmet of a type
approved by the director of DMV. Likewise, the
amended statutes regarding the use and operation of
bicycles, N.J.S.A. 39:4-10.1 to 39:4-10.4, 39:4-14.4a
and 39:4-14.7a, require a person under 14 years of age to
wear a properly fitted and fastened bicycle helmet which
meets specified standards. The parent or guardian of a
person who violates this statute is subject to a warning
and fine if it is shown that the parent or guardian failed
to exercise reasonable supervision or control over the
bicycle operator. Similar requirements are imposed on
persons under 14 years of age using a skateboard or roller
skates, including in-line skates. N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.5 to
39:4-14.9.
XII. PARKING
A. Handicap Parking
A person who parks a motor vehicle in a zone or space
specifically marked with an appropriate sign designating
that zone or space for handicapped parking (N.J.S.A.
39:4-8.1), is subject to the following penalties: a fine of
$100 for the first offense and for subsequent offenses, a
fine of at least $100 and up to 90 days community service
or both. N.J.S.A. 39:4-197.
Any eligible handicapped person may request a law
enforcement officer to arrange for the removal and storage
of a motor vehicle which is parked unlawfully in a parking
space or zone which is restricted for use by a handicapped
person. N.J.S.A. 39:4-207.7. See, N.J.S.A. 39:4-204 et
seq. for definitions of handicapped persons and
eligibility.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-197.9 et seq., was adopted to permit
municipal governments to establish a “handicapped
parking enforcement unit,” to specifically enforce the
provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-197.5 which allows for the
designation of parking spaces for the exclusive use to park
motor vehicles of handicapped persons, whose vehicle
display either a handicapped license plate or
identification card issued by DMV or an equivalent
entity in another jurisdiction.
XIII. SPEEDING
A. Observational OffenseA speeding violation under N.J.S.A. 39:4-98 can be
proved without the use of radar or other speed measuring
instruments. An individual can express an opinion about
the speed at which a vehicle is operating. Baus v. Trenton
& Mercer Traction Corp., 102 N.J.L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1925),
aff’d 102 N.J.L. 712 (E&A 1926). Individuals can
express an opinion about the speed of a vehicle based
upon its sound without having seen it. Pierson v.
Frederickson, 102 N.J. Super. 156, 162 (App. Div. 1968).
Moreover, proof of the exact speed at which a vehicle is
operating is not an essential element of the proofs of the
offense. State v. Bookbinder, 82 N.J. Super. 179, 183
(App. Div. 1963), aff’g 76 N.J. Super. 443 (Cty. Ct.
1962). See also, State v. Padavano, 81 N.J. Super. 321,
326 (App. Div. 1963).B. Statutory constructionState v. Green, 327 N.J. Super. 334 (App. Div. 2000),
reversed defendant’s conviction for speeding in a school
zone. While defendant was driving 51 miles per hour in
a 25 mile per hour school zone near 1:00 p.m. across from
an elementary school, fatal to the State’s case was a lack
of evidence that school was actually in session and, if so,
that it was recess and children were visible from the road,
or that children were going to or leaving school during its
opening or closing hours. Adopting its holding in State
v. Beierle, 325 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 1999), certif.
denied 165 N.J. 132 (2000), that N.J.S.A. 39:4-98a
establishes a school zone speed limit only under such
circumstances, the court concluded that the State in this
case had not proven that the 25 mile per hour speed zone
applied to defendant. Beierle reversed defendant’s
conviction for speeding in a school zone “when children
are present.” Children were playing on fields on school
grounds between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m., and were clearly
visible from the roadway defendant traveled. However,
the lower speed limit defendant was found to have
exceeded only had force during school recess when
children were visible from the roadway or when they were
going to or leaving school in the morning and afternoon.
Thus, it was not in force at the time defendant drove his
vehicle.In State v. Van Syoc, 235 N.J. Super. 463 (Law Div.
1989), aff’d 235 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 1989),
defendant on appeal claimed the speeding statute,
N.J.S.A. 39:4-98, only specifies lawful speeds but does
not proscribe exceeding the speed limit as unlawful