cdTOCtest

signs, each no more than forty square feet, was not
unconstitutionally vague. The court cited the
government’s interest in limiting negative secondary
effects such as neighborhood deterioration and
concentration of crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:34-7c; Hamilton
Amusement Center v. Verniero, 156 N.J. at 268-76. See
also Saddle Brook v. A.B. Family Center, 307 N.J. Super. 17
(App. Div. 1998) (1000 foot buffer around sexually
oriented businesses may apply beyond the jurisdictional
limits and multi-town zones may be created).

Also in 1995, the legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:33-
12.2, which prohibits certain commercial establish-
ments from providing booths or similar enclosures which
would facilitate sexual activity by customers. The
legislative history indicates that the statute was enacted
to stem the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. Chez
Sez VIII, Inc. v. Poritz, 297 N.J. Super. 331, 339, certif.
denied, 149 N.J. 409 (1997). The State was also
concerned with mitigating other secondary negative
effects caused by sexually oriented businesses, and
intended “to improve traffic safety, to limit harm to
minors, and to reduce prostitution, crime, juvenile
delinquency, deterioration in property values, and
lethargy in neighborhood improvement efforts.”
Hamilton Amusement Center v. Verniero, 156 N.J. at 273.
The provision was deemed not to violate the First
Amendment nor be unconstitutionally vague in Chez Sez
VIII, Inc. v. Poritz, supra.

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICEOBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICEOBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICEOBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICEOBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

(See also, ELUDING, ESCAPE, FLIGHT,

HINDERING, RESISTING ARREST,

CONTEMPT, this Digest)

Chapter 29 of the Code of Criminal Justice codifies

the common law crimes relating to the obstruction of

governmental operations. However, the wide sweep of

the common law crime of obstruction of justice has been

significantly narrowed in the Code. State v. Kent, 173

N.J. Super. 215, 222 (App. Div. 1980). It should be

noted that in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:1-5, all

common law crimes have been abolished.

A. Obstruction defined, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1

A disorderly persons offense is committed when one

purposely obstructs the administration of law or prevents

or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully

performing an official function. There must be

affirmative interference with governmental functions. A

violation of this provision is elevated to a crime of the

fourth degree if the actor obstructs the detection or

investigation of a crime or the prosecution of a person for

a crime. (Source: N.J.S.A. 2A:99-1). Note that the

provision was recently amended on April 28, 2000, by

adding flight as a means whereby a person can prevent or

attempt to prevent a public servant from lawfully

performing an official function. Before the amendment,

the provision neither criminalized running from the

police nor resisting one’s own arrest. See State v. Henry,

323 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1999); State v. Garrison,

230 N.J. Super. 609 (App. Div. 1989).

In State v. Doss, 254 N.J. Super. 122 (App. Div.),

certif. denied, 130 N.J. 17 (1992), defendant fled when

informed that the police were approaching in an

unmarked cruiser. The police pursued him into an alley,

at which time a foot chase ensued. During the pursuit,

defendant ignored an officer’s repeated order to stop.

Defendant was ultimately apprehended and found to be

in possession of drugs. The Appellate Division affirmed

the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress

based on its conclusion that by refusing to comply with

the policemen’s order to halt for the purpose of an

investigatory detention, defendant had violated N.J.S.A.

2C:29-1 in the presence of the officers, thus entitling

them to arrest him and conduct a search incident to the

arrest.

In State v. Wanczyk, 201 N.J. Super. 258 (App. Div.

1985), police officers stopped a vehicle in which