cdTOCtest

defendant was a passenger on the suspicion that the
occupants of the vehicle had been involved in an arson
incident. Observing a bulge in defendant’s pocket, an
officer began a pat-down search but defendant became
extremely abusive, cursing and moving his arms about in
an irate manner. It became virtually impossible to
continue the pat-down search as defendant began
striking and spitting at the officers. Accordingly, the
officers placed him under arrest for obstruction of justice.
The Appellate Division held that defendant’s actions
impaired the officers’ efforts to perform their official
function, and reversed a trial court ruling that the arrest
was pretextual.

In State v. Perlstein, 206 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div.
1985), a police officer saw defendant driving in a car with
a PBA door decal on her windshield just above the
inspection sticker. After the officer advised her to remove
the sticker, defendant became uncooperative, refused to
remove it, refused to produce her license, registration or
insurance card and attempted to start the car with the
officer in the doorway. She then refused to get out of the
car. After arrest she was taken to police headquarters
where she initially refused to give any arrest information
but finally cooperated. Affirming her conviction for
obstruction, the court held that she purposely engaged in
independently unlawful acts when she refused to show
her driving credentials and when she attempted to move
her car contrary to the officer’s directions. The court
rejected defendant’s contention that she fit within
exceptions provided in the statute, since a stop for a motor
vehicle violation does not necessarily constitute an arrest
and she was not arrested until she attempted to leave the
scene. She was not engaged in “flight by a person charged
with a crime,” since the offense was only quasi-criminal
in nature. Her failure to show her driving credentials was
not a failure “to perform a legal duty” but an independent
unlawful act.

In State v. Carminati, 170 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div.
1979), certif. denied, 82 N.J. 274 (1979), a pre-code case,
an agreement to inform a sentencing judge of matters
relevant to a defendant being sentenced, such as his
character, contrition, prior good conduct and the like,
was held lawful. Therefore, those who communicate
such information, even for the purpose of influencing the
judge to be lenient, cannot be regarded as acting to
obstruct justice. When, as in this case, the agreement was
not to advise the judge of some overlooked facet of a
defendant’s background, but rather, to secure the
intercession of a political figure to persuade and corrupt
the judge on matters extraneous to the merits of the

sentencing decision, a jury could properly find a

conspiracy to obstruct justice.

In State v. Kent, 173 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div.

1980), defendant, an attorney, was accused of placing,

offering to place or assisting to place a child for purposes

of adoption without proper authority. Among other

offenses, he was charged with obstructing the

administration of law under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1. The facts

alleged were that defendant induced persons involved in

the placements to mislead the investigation and withhold

“the true and complete facts.” The Appellate Division

found that these facts would constitute an obstruction of

the administration of law “by means of any

independently unlawful act” (see N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5a),

and thus refused to dismiss the charges.

In State v. Berlow, 284 N.J. Super. 356 (Law Div.

1995), defendant, the proprietor of a rooming house,

refused to allow the police to enter his residence despite

their concern, later proved unfounded, that a shooting

victim was located inside. Despite their request to enter

the premises, the defendant repeatedly informed the

police that he would not allow them inside without a

search warrant. He then slammed the door shut and

locked it. Based on the exigent circumstances that they

believed existed, the police broke through the door. After

searching unsuccessfully for the shooting victim, the

police arrested defendant and charged him with

obstruction. Although finding that defendant’s conduct

satisfied the elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1a, the trial

court concluded that because defendant was validly

exercising his Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures by preventing a

warrantless entry into his premises, he could not be

convicted of obstruction.

B. Compounding Defined, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-4

A person commits the crime of compounding if he

accepts or agrees to accept, or confers or agrees to confer,

any pecuniary benefit in consideration of refraining from

reporting to law enforcement authorities the commission

or suspected commission of any offense or information

relating to an offense or from seeking prosecution of an

offense. It is an affirmative defense to this provision that

the pecuniary benefit did not exceed an amount which

the actor reasonably believed to be due as restitution or

indemnification for harm caused by the offense.

In State v. Jardim, 226 N.J. Super. 497 (Law Div.

1988), evidence presented to the Grand Jury disclosed

that Jardim, using three intermediaries, paid large sums