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of money to the mother of a 15-year-old girl whom
Jardim had allegedly molested as an inducement to leave
the state and not return for any grand jury or court
proceedings. The trial court denied the motion of
Jardim’s associates to dismiss the charges of
compounding based on their claim that they had not
committed the underlying offense. Specifically, the trial
court concluded that because the provision provides that
one may compound a crime by conferring a pecuniary
benefit upon the victim, the confederates were properly
charged with compounding.

PERJURY AND FALSE SWEARINGPERJURY AND FALSE SWEARINGPERJURY AND FALSE SWEARINGPERJURY AND FALSE SWEARINGPERJURY AND FALSE SWEARING

I. PERJURY

A. Definition

A person who makes a false statement, which the

person does not believe to be true, under oath in an

official proceeding is guilty of perjury when the

statement is material. N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1a; State v.

Anderson, 127 N.J. 191, 198 (1992).

B. Materiality

A statement is material if it could have affected the

outcome of the proceeding or the disposition of the

matter, whether or not the statement is admissible under

the rules of evidence. N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1b.

The materiality requirement may be satisfied by

testimony that tends directly or circumstantially to prove

an ultimate matter in issue, and also by testimony

relating to a collateral matter which has the capacity to

affect the weight of the evidence bearing on the ultimate

issue, and thereby influence the tribunal. State v. Winters,

140 N.J. Super. 110, 118 (Law Div. 1976). False

testimony bearing on credibility may be material. Id. at

118-19. “[T]he question is whether [the false] statement

could have affected the prior jury’s verdict.” Anderson,

127 N.J. at 203. Materiality is assessed by considering

the testimony at the time it was given. Winters, at 119.

1. Materiality, as an element of the offense, must be
   decided by the jury.

According to the statute, “[w]hether a falsification is

material is a matter of law.” N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1b. The

New Jersey Supreme Court held in State v. Anderson,

supra, that this statutory provision irreconcilably

conflicted with the constitutional right of an accused to

have a jury determine every element of the crime charged.

127 N.J. at 194. Some three years later the United States

Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in United

States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).

2. The right to a jury finding is not retroactive.

The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Purnell,

161 N.J. 44 (1999), reversed the decision of the

Appellate Division, which had overruled the trial court

and granted post-conviction relief on the ground that

materiality was not found by the jury at defendant’s trial.

The Court held that the failure to submit the element of