In State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113 (1988), the Court
held that R. 3:9-2 requires the trial court to inform the
defendant of the parole consequences of a sentence to
Avenel. As a result of the trial court’s failure to inform
defendant, defendant was permitted to withdraw his
guilty plea. The court further found that in determining
whether defendant is a repetitive sex offender due process
does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt; rather,
proof by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient.
XI. CLASSIFICATION
Determination as to which inmate shall be classified
as a minimum security prisoner, and thus eligible for
various privileges, is a matter within the discretion of
prison officials. State v. Richardson, 130 N.J. Super. 63
(Law Div. 1974); State v. Rydzewski, 112 N.J. Super. 517
(App. Div. 1970).
Placement of a prisoner in a particular institution is
an administrative decision to be made by the
Department of Corrections, and any appeal must be
made to the Appellate Division. State v. Clark, 54 N.J.
25, 26 (1969); State v. Cook, 330 N.J. Super. at 415; State
v. Rydzewski, 112 N.J. Super. at 520; R. 2:2-3(a)(2).
XII. WORK AND COMMUTATION CREDITS
Commutation and work credits cannot reduce a
statutorily or judicially-imposed mandatory minimum
term of incarceration. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51a; Merola v.
Department of Corrections, 285 N.J. Super. 501, 509
(App. Div. 1995), certif. denied 143 N.J. 519 (1996);
State v. Davis, 175 N.J. Super. 130, 142-146 (App. Div.
1980), certif. denied 85 N.J. 136 (1980).
When an inmate is sentenced to a mandatory
minimum term, any commutation and work credits
earned will be awarded upon the expiration of the
mandatory minimum term for application to the
remainder of the sentence. Merola v. Department of
Corrections, 285 N.J.Super. at 510. Murder defendant’s
30-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment was
not subject to reduction through application of
commutation and work credits. Id. at 510-11.
In Trantino v. Department of Corrections, 168 N.J.
Super. 220 (App. Div. 1979), certif. denied 81 N.J. 338
(1979), the Appellate Division held that the policy of the
Department of Corrections which denied prisoners,
whose death sentences were commuted to life
imprisonment, work credits toward parole eligibility for
the time spent on death row did not violate the
constitutional guarantees of equal protection or due
process. The Court held that the prisoners were not
entitled to work credits for work they did not perform. Id.
at 224-26. See, e.g., Zink v. Lear, 28 N.J. Super. 515
(App. Div. 1953).In Karatz v. Scheidemantel, 226 N.J. Super. 468 (App.
Div. 1988), the Court held that: the Law Division lacked
jurisdiction over inmate’s habeas corpus petition alleging
wrongful denial of early release; and inmate sentenced to
mandatory minimum term to Avenel as subsequent
offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-6 was not entitled to
deduction from sentence of commutation and work
credits.In Savad v. Corrections Dep’t, 178 N.J. Super. 386
(App. Div. 1981), certif. denied 87 N.J. 389 (1981), the
court held that Title 2A sex offenders who were
resentenced under the penal code, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1d(2),
were eligible for work and good behavior credits under
N.J.S.A. 30:4-92 and 30:4-140 which should be
calculated from the effective date of the code. Id. at 392-
393.Title 2A sex offenders who were not resentenced
under the Code, still continue to serve their sentences
under the Sex Offender Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:164-10, and
thus were not eligible for work and good time credits.
Savad v. Corrections Dep’t, 178 N.J. Super. at 390-391.
See Attorney General, F.O. No. 11 (1980). See, e.g., State
v. Fernandez, 209 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1986).The denial of commutation and/or work credits to
sex offenders sentenced under Title 2A does not violate
the United States or New Jersey Constitutions. Prevard v.
Fauver, 47 F.Supp.2d 539, 544 (D.N.J. 1999), aff’d 202
F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1999); State v. Fernandez, 209 N.J.
Super. at 47-51.Administrative regulation which prevented partially
paralyzed inmate from earning work credits did not
violate his rights to due process and equal protection.
Rowe v. Fauver, 533 F.Supp. 1239 (D.N.J. 1982).XIII. PAROLE REVOCATION
Any parolee who is convicted of a crime while on
parole shall have parole revoked and be returned to
custody unless the parolee demonstrates, by clear and
convincing evidence, that good cause exists why he or she
should not be returned to confinement. N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.60(e).