cdTOCtest

Doctrine of fundamental fairness and principles of
double jeopardy did not preclude imposition of both
parole revocation and criminal prosecution from
absconding from parole. State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438
(1998); State v. Eisenman, 153 N.J. 462 (1998).

In N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Mannson, 220 N.J. Super.
566 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied 110 N.J. 194
(1988), the Appellate Division held that reconvening a
parole revocation hearing before a hearing officer, prior to
a final determination on the merits, did not violate a
parolee’s due process rights. The court further held that
the double jeopardy clause does not apply to parole
revocation hearings and, therefore, did not preclude
admission of additional evidence after the completion of
the initial hearing before a hearing officer.

In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593,
33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), the Supreme Court found that
Due Process requires the following minimum
requirements prior to revocation of parole:

1. written notice of the claimed violations;


2. disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him;


3. opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses and
   evidence;
   4. the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
   witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
   good cause for not allowing the confrontation);


4. a neutral and detached hearing body;


5. a statement by the factfinders of the evidence relied on
   and reasons for revoking parole.

In Home News Pub. Co. v. State, 224 N.J. Super. 7
(App. Div. 1988), newspaper brought an action
challenging the Parole Board’s refusal to give newspaper
access to certain Parole Board records. The Appellate
Division held that: the court was required to examine
document either in camera or in preliminary indexing
format in evaluating allegations of exemptions from
disclosure: and the Parole Board was required to review
requested documents on a case-by-case basis, disclosing
only such nonconfidential information as it deemed
consistent with standards of protection and openness.

XIV. DISCIPLINARY HEARING

In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963,
41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court found that

due process requires the imposition of several safeguards

in prison disciplinary procedures which could result in

the loss of credits or imposition of solitary confinement.

Prisoners must be:

1. afforded advance written notice of the claimed
   violation;


2. inmates must be presented a written statement of fact
   findings;
   3. inmates have the right to call witnesses and present
   documentary evidence where such would not be unduly
   hazardous to the institutional safety or correctional goals;


3. they must be heard before an impartial review board.

The Court found that prisoners’ Sixth Amendment

rights of confrontation and cross-examination, as well as

the right to counsel, did not attach. The Court also held

that mail from attorneys to inmates could be opened by

prison officials in the presence of inmates but not read

without infringing upon the prisoners’ First, Sixth, or

14th Amendment rights.

In Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496 (1975), the New

Jersey Supreme Court held that procedural due process in

a disciplinary hearing requires that the defendant be

afforded:

1. Notice - written notice of specific alleged violation.
   2. Impartial Tribunal - the Adjustment Committee
   shall sit at the disciplinary hearing. Such committee shall
   not consist of more than one person selected from the
   correctional staff.


2. Discovery - disclosure of the evidence against him.


3. Reasons - statement by the factfinders of the evidence
   relied on and reasons for their action.

The Court reviewed the applicable standards for

disciplinary hearings under the New Jersey law and

found that they were in full compliance with the rules set

forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonald,

supra.

The Court also held that a prisoner appearing before

the Adjustment Committee must be advised both at the

disciplinary hearing and at the investigative interview

which precedes it, not only of his right to remain silent

but also of his right to make a statement concerning the