cdTOCtest

State v. Gervasio, 94 N.J. 23 (1983) (ruling in Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979), which held
that random stops of vehicles on public roads violated the
Fourth Amendment, is not retroactive); State v.
Carpentieri, 82 N.J. 546 (1980) (same).

State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 348-349 (1982) (holding
that toll records of an individual may not be legitimately
procured in absence of a judicial sanction or proceeding,
was not retroactive);

State v. Young, 87 N.J. 132, 139-141 (1981) (rule of
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476
(1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct.
2586 (1979), which stated that absent exigent circum-
stances police could not, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, conduct a warrantless search of luggage
found in an automobile, could only be used retroactively to
invalidate searches that occurred after June 21, 1977, the
date of the Chadwick decision).

State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 568-569 (1975) (holding
in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), setting the
parameters in which a criminal defendant is allowed to
challenge the validity of a search warrant on the basis of
alleged false statements in a supporting affidavit, was only
applied prospectively), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 554, 100
S.Ct. 527 (1979).

State v. Skidmore, 253 N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div.
1992) (finding that State v. Hemple, 120 N.J. 182 (1990),
which invalidated warrantless garbage searches did not
apply retroactively to search that took place before date of
opinion).

State v. Sarto, 195 N.J. Super. 565, 573 (App. Div.
1984) (holding that rulings in United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982), and New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (1981), applied
retroactively).

State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 446-448 (1981)
(minimization requirements in wiretap cases applied
prospectively only).

State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 402-411 (1981) (ruling
that decision in State v. Cerbo, 78 N.J. 595 (1979), that
delay in presenting tapes of intercepted conversations for
sealing requirements mandates suppression unless a
satisfying reason for the delay is shown, was not
retroactive).

B. Miranda and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments

In Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 1338

(1984), the United States Court held that Edwards v.

Arizona, supra, would not be retroactively applied in a

collateral review of a final conviction (habeas proceeding).

Id. at 650, 104 S.Ct. at 1345. The Court declined to rule

on what effect, if any, Edwards would have on cases in

which the convictions were not final at the time that

decision was rendered. Id., 104 S.Ct. at 1346. See Tate v.

Rose, 466 U.S. 1301, 104 S.Ct. 2186 (1984) (granting

petition for stay).

Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court has refused

to give retroactive effect to the Edwards decision. In State

v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 28 (1982), the Court held that the

per se rule of Edwards only applied to trials that began after

the date the decision was announced on May 18, 1981.

See State v. Abronski, 145 N.J. 265 (1996) (State v.

Reed, 133 N.J. 237 (1993), which addressed informing a

suspect in custody of an attorney’s presence did not apply

retroactively).

State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233 (1996) (State v. Sanchez,

129 N.J. 261 (1992), which held that the mere recitation of

Miranda warnings did not provide an indicted defendant

with sufficient information to give a knowing and

voluntary waiver of counsel was given limited retroactive

effect to apply in that case and not to defendants who had

exhausted all avenues of direct relief at the time Sanchez was

decided).

State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 4047 (1990) (rule in State v.

Hartley, 103 N.J. 252 (1986), addressing the invocation of

the right to silence applied retroactively), cert. denied, 499

U.S. 931, 111 S.Ct. 1336, 113 L.Ed.2d 268 (1991).

State v. Stever, 107 N.J. 543, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 ,

108 S.Ct. 348 (1987) (decision in Berkemer v. McCarty,

468 U.S. 420 (1984), requiring Miranda warnings in

connection with arrests for minor traffic offenses to be

applied retroactively).But see State v. Adams, 200 N.J.

Super. 385 (App. Div.) (ruling that Berkemer v. McCarty,

holding would not be retroactively applied), certif. denied,

101 N.J. 331 (1985).

C. Other Retroactivity Decisions

Cases involving juries, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S.

314, 107 S.Ct. 708 (1987) (ruling in Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986), should be

retroactively applied to cases pending on direct state or