federal review or not yet final when Batson was decided);
Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 106 S.Ct. 2878 (1986)
(ruling Batson would not be applied retroactively on
collateral review of convictions that became final before the
Batson decision was announced).
Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 100 S.Ct. 2214
(1980) (holding retroactive the rule announced in Burch v.
Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 99 S.Ct. 1623 (1979), that a
conviction of a non-petty criminal offense by a non-
unanimous six person jury violates the right to trial
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments was
retroactively applied).
State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41 (1997) (holding in State
v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563 (1994), requiring the jury
instructions to define elements of an offense of the drug
kingpin statute applied retroactively); State v. Burgess, 298
N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div. 1997), aff’d, 154 N.J. 181, 183-
84 (1998) (same).
State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392, 408-10 (1980)
(proscribing Allen charges as impermissible jury influences,
was granted limited retroactive application to cases
pending at time of the decision).
State v. Cupe, 289 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div.) (defendant
and other similarly situated who had exhausted all avenues
of direct appeal before ruling in State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194
(1990) which prohibits sequential jury charges in murder
cases where there is evidence of passion/provocation
manslaughter, may not obtain post-conviction relief on
ground that sequential jury charges were not given at trial),
certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589 (1996).
State v. Anderson, 173 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div.)
(allowed retroactive application of the decision in State v.
Trent, 79 N.J. 251 (1979), which required the trial court to
instruct the entire jury to begin deliberations anew when an
alternate juror was substituted during jury deliberations),
certif. denied, 85 N.J. 124 (1980).
State v. Long, 204 N.J. Super. 469 (Law Div. 1985)
(decision that the jury selection process in Atlantic County
violated the mandatory provisions of the jury selection
statutes calling for “random” selection would be given
prospective effect only). In State v. [Joseph] Long, 216 N.J.
Super. 269 (App. Div. 1987) the Appellate Division
declined to give retroactive application of the Law Division
decision in State v. [Ronald] Long, 204 N.J. Super. 469 (Law
Div. 1985) which held that the jury selection process in
Atlantic County did not meet statutory requirement of
randomness.
Cases involving guilty pleas: the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruling in State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 486-87
(1982), which held that a defendant must be informed at
the time of his plea that a period of parole ineligibility
could be imposed as part of his sentence, was retroactive to
September 1, 1979, the effective date of the penal code. See
State v. Lark, 117 N.J. 331, 341 (1989) (applying limited
retroactive effect to that case and other cases pending at the
time of the decision in State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113
(1988) which held that defendant in a plea arrangement
must be informed of the effect of his sentence to Avenel and
parole eligibility).
Cases involving other areas of the law: in State v. One
1990 Honda Accord, 154 N.J. 373 (1998), the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the owner of property that is not
prima facie contraband is entitled to a jury trial in an action
to forfeit property. In reaching its decision, the Court
essentially invalidated the statutory summary procedure
enunciated in N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3f. The Court later
addressed the issue of retroactivity and stated that the One
1990 Honda decision was to be applied to all pending cases
and those pending on direct appeal.
See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059
(1997) (amendments to the habeas corpus statute by the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
did not apply to an inmate’s pending non-capital case; the
new provisions generally applied only to cases filed after its
enactment).
State v. Clark, 162 N.J. 201, 208 (2000) (amendment
to R. 1:15-3(b) precluding municipal prosecutors from
simultaneously serving as defense counsel in the same
county in which he or she serves as a municipal prosecutor
shall not apply retroactively).
State v. Harvey, 159 N.J. 277, 291 (1999) (amendment
to the Death Penalty Statute which limited the universe of
cases considered during proportionality review did not
apply retroactively to a case that was pending when the
statute was enacted), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 120 S.Ct.
811, 145 L.Ed.2d 683 (2000).
State v. Yothers, 282 N.J. Super. 86 (App. Div. 1995)
(discussing retroactive effect of state constitutional
amendment addressing murder).
Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 114 S.Ct. 1280 (1994)
(rule under Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991)
regarding promptness of judicial probable cause determi-
nation applied retroactively); State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259,
269 (McLaughlin rule applied retroactively to defendant’s