XOTES, BOOK VII. 14. 281
i&ots Sv; or 3) ‘we ask if we could only have our prayer,’ or
(though it be only an ideal,’ as above, Karl +jv, iv. 11. I,
?iohirclav riv tar’ ~CX~Y yivop&qv.Kfl‘r yhp 6; TdVraS iV8lxX”rUr UTOdaiOUS €bfll, pi Kfl$ ZKflUTOU 6; TiV 18. 10.
ro~rriv, uikms aipFr&wpov, riKo~OV~f; yhp r+ ~aff Ln~mv xai rd nLvras.
He seems to mean that although there might be some common
idea of virtue which the citizens attained collectively, such as
patriotism, yet it viould be better that each individual should he
virtuous, for each implies all. 2, 7; yhp lrdms
~LTT~V, K.T.X., where he distinguishes ‘ each’ from ‘ all.’Compare, ii. 3.%id rc oi&v B+cXos +ivai’ rd yhp :e1 pcrapaXciv rorci, K.T.~.
Lit. ‘ Some qualities there is no use in having by nature ; for
habit alters them; and through nature,’ or ‘such is their nsturc
that, they are swayed by habit both towards good and towards
evil.’ To us the reasoning of this passage appears singular.
Yet probably what Aristotle means to say is, that moral qualities,
if given by nature, would cease to be moral, and in so far as they
are moral would cease to be natural. Nature in this passage is
used for instinct,’ or natural impulse.’ From another point of
view (Nic. Eth. ii. 1. 4 2) he shows, using the term +;air in a some-
what different sense, that things vhich are purely natural cannot
be altered by habit ; but that nature supplies the conditions under
nhich habits may be cultivated.- I I.
Cp. also infra, c. 15. 7.Er+ovp.. , 4 roirs airois 6ih piov.
‘Are rulers and subjects to differ at different times, or to be the- I.
same always ?’
roir 6pxop~uo‘s. 14. 2.
I) *Dative of reference : (In relation to their subjects,’ or, 2) rith
a more obvious construction, but with a feebler sense, rois ~XVJOCE
may be taken after +avfpdv, so that the superiority of the governors
is manifest to their subjects.’
%&a(. 14. 3.
The same who is mentioned in Herodotus (iv. 44) as sailing
down the Indus by order of Darius Hystaspes. Whether the